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HUMAN-NONHUMAN CHIMERAS:
A REGULATORY PROPOSAL ON THE
BLURRING OF SPECIES LINES
Abstract: The chimera of modern biotechnology is defined broadly as a
single organism composed of a mixture of materials from two or more
organisms possessing distinct genetic backgrounds. Unlike the United
States, which does not regulate chimeras directly, Canada has responded to
the unregulated pursuit of chimera technology by banning certain chim-
eras as part of comprehensive legislation designed to regulate human
reproductive technologies. In 2001, the Canadian Parliament passed the
Assisted Human Reproduction Act despite criticism urging greater legis-
lative justification for the Act's provisions and modification to its statutory
definitions, Because current regulatory mechanisms in the United States,
including patent law and administrative oversight, fail to regulate chimera
technology, the United States should enact new legislation, using Canada's
legislation as a model, to prohibit embryonic chimeras and to regulate
other human-nonhuman combinations. Unregulated biotechnology threat,
ens to disrupt legal and social institutions; therefore, the United States
must make a balanced effort now to protect the public interest.
INTRODUCTION
The Chimera of ancient Greek mythology was a fire-breathing
beast with a lion's head, goat's body, and dragon's tail that ravaged
the kingdom of Lycia until the hero, Bellerophon, destroyed if. 1 The
chimera of modern biotechnology is defined broadly as a single or-
ganism composed of a mixture of materials from two or more organ-
isms possessing distinct genetic backgrounds. 2 The mythological ori-
gin of the term reflects not only the multispecies composition of
chimeras, but also their potential, as products of unbridled techno-
logical innovation, to generate disruption and confusion in society. 3
THOMAS BUIFINCII, Tim Act: or FABLE (1855), reprinted in Buismcit's NIrrnotowe
3, 117-18 (Random House 1993).
2 Henry T. Greely, Defining Chimeras ... and Chimeric Concerns, 3 Am. J. Ilimmucs,
Stmuner 2003, at 17, 17-19 (recommending an exhaustive taxonomy to aid the analysis of
ethical concerns presented by various forms of chimeras).
3 See Jason Scott Robert & Francoise Baylis. Crossing Species Boundaries, 3 An. J.
Iliorrutcs, Summer 2003, at 1, 9 (discussing ethical aspects of creating chimeras followed
by responses from over two dozen commentators). But see Robert Streiffer, In Defense of the
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Chimeras were once merely the fantastic creations of science
fiction; however, rapid advances in genetics, cloning, and embryology
have resulted in the blurring of species lines, including our own spe-
cies, Homo sopiens.4 In particular, recent advances in the development
of chimeras have led to the creation of a variety of organisms with
both human and animal components. 5
Despite these scientific developments and the expanding discus-
sion of chimeras among bioethicists, legal discourse has not explored
thoroughly the implications of this emerging technolog-y.6 In the
United States, there is no regulatory body prepared to address the
specific legal and ethical issues that chimeras present.? The Food and
Drug Administration (the "FDA") has not extended its regulatory reach
to embryonic chimeras,8 although it has made a controversial claim of
jurisdiction over human cloning.9 Furthermore, present efforts to regu-
late federally funded research, such as President George W Bush's limi-
tation on the creation of new stein cell lines, do not encompass chi-
mera technology directly, or private biotechnology research generally.°
Likewise, internal methods of biotechnology regulation, including self-
policing organizations and institutional review boards, have proven to
be insufficient regulators of biotechnology."
Unlike the United States, Canada responded to the unregulated
pursuit of chimera technology by banning certain human-nonhuman
Moral Relevance of Species Boundaries, 3 Am. J. Morn' ics, Summer 2003, at 37, 37 (asserting
that Robert and Baylis offer no empirical evidence to support their claim that the exis-
tence of chimeras would introduce inexorable moral confusion).
See Robert & Baylis, supra note 3, at 1, 4-6. The existence of species lines, however, is
biologically problematic. See infra notes 266-267 and accompanying text.
5 Robert & Baylis, supra note 3, at 4; see infra notes 42-70 and accompanying text.
6 See A.M. Chakrabarty, Crossing Species Boundaries and Making Human-Nonhuman Hy-
brids: Moral and Legal Ramifications, 3 Am. J. Iltormitcs, Summer 2003, at 20, 21.
7 See ERIE PARENS & LORI P. KNOWLES, THE HASTINGS OUR., REPROGENICS AND PUBLIC
POLICY: REFLECTIONS AND RECONIMENDATIONS 17 {Stipp. 2003), available at lutp://thehas
tingscenter.org/pdf/reprogenetics_and_public_policy.pdf.
a See id. at 12.
Sec Gregory J. Rokosz, Human Cloning: Is the Reach of FDA Authority Tao Far a Stretch?,
30 SVION HALL L. REV. 464, 511-12 (2000) (asserting that despite the benefits of agency
regulation, FDA jurisdiction over cloning is unlikely to survive a serious challenge).
In See President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on Stem Cell Research from
Crawford. Texas, 37 WEFEILV Count'. PRE'S. Doc. 1149, 1151 (Aug. 9, 2001),
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.govirgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2001_presidential doctunents&
dock1=- pd13atiOlixt-9.pdf.
11 See Lori A. Alvino, Note, Who's Watching the Watchdogs? Responding to the Erosion of Re-
search Ethics by Enforcing Promises, 103 Ccu.um. L. REV. 893, 901-09 (2003) (suggesting that
administrative regulations governing federally funded research on human subjects and
oversight by institutional review boards provide inadequate safeguards).
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combinations as part of comprehensive legislation designed to regulate
human reproductive technologies) 2 The Canadian Parliament passed
the Assisted Human Reproduction Act (the "AHR Act") in 2004, 13 de-
spite criticism urging greater legislative justification for the Act's provi-
sions and modification to the statutory definitions." In contrast, legisla-
tors in the United States have Struggled to reach a consensus on
embryo research and human cloning, but have yet to address chimeras
specifically. 15 The United States, therefore, should confront the press-
ing issues arising from the creation of novel beings by implementing
legislation modeled after Canada's AHR Act. 16
This Note weighs the arguments for and against regulating the
creation of various types of chimeras," evaluates opportunities to regu-
late chimeras within existing institutions, 18 and examines Canada's
AHR Act as a possible model for legislation in the United States.° Part I
of this Note explains the science behind chimera creation as it pertains
to the complex definitional issues inherent in regulation." Part II of
this Note sets forth some of the ethical and legal arguments in support
of and in opposition to the regulation of chimeras. 21 Part III examines
the potential use of existing legal mechanisms to regulate chimeras,
including patent law, the FDA, and existing laws. 22 Part IV analyzes
12 Sec Assisted Human Reproduction Act, ch. 2, 2004 S.C. (Can.) (received Royal As-
sent on Man 29. 2004), available at http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/english/pdf/protection/ahr/
C-6_4_RA.pdf.
15 Id. For an overview of the Canadian legislative process, see generally SENATE El' AL.,
INSIDE CANADA'S PARLIAMEN'll AN INTRODUCTION 'It) How 'nit: CANADIAN PARLIAMENT
WORKS 1, 26 (2002), available at http://wwW.parl.gc.ca/Information/library/inside/pcif/in-
side-canada-parliament-e.ixlf. To become law in Canada, a bill first must be introduced in
either the Senate or the House of Commons. Id. The bill then passes through the first read-
ing, second reading, committee stage, report stage, and third reading in each house. Id. Fol-
lowing Royal Assent by the Governor General, the bill becomes law. Id.
14 Sec Timothy Caulfield, Symposium on Bill C-13: The Assisted Human Reproduction Act, 11
Hunt: rn L. Rev. 3, 3 (2002) (reflecting general themes of symposium).
13 See PARENS & KNOWLES, supra note 7, at 17,
113 See Stuart A. Newman, Averting the Clone Age: Prospects and Perils of Human Developmen-
tal Manipulation, 19 .1. CONTEMP, HEALTH L. & 1'00( 431, 462 (2003) (suggesting a bright-
line rule to prohibit genetic and cellular manipulations of human embryos); Lauren Cir-
lin, Conunent, Human or Animal: A Resolution to the Biotechnological Blurring of the Lines, 32
Sw. U. L. Rix. 501, 519-20 (2003) (recommending that Congress decide whether to allow
or prohibit human-nonhuman chimera research).
17 See infra notes 71-95 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 96-207 and accompanying text,
I° See infra notes 208-249 and accompanying text.
1° See infra notes 26-70 and accompanying text.
II Sec infra notes 71-95 and accompanying text.
22 Sec infra notes 96-207 and accompanying text.
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Canada's AHR Act and describes the critical debate surrounding this
legislation." Part V addresses the constitutional and legal implications
of modeling legislation in the United States after the AHR Act includ-
ing scientific expression under the First Amendment, the concept of
personhood, and protection for chimeras under the Thirteenth
Amendment. 24
 Filially, Part VI argues that because current mechanisms
fail to regulate chimera technology, the United States should enact leg-
islation, using Canada's AHR Act as a model, to prohibit the use of
human gametes and embryos to make chimeras. 25
I. SCIENTIFIC TECHNOLOGY AND THE PRODUCTION OF CHIMERAS
Regulators must understand and reference the underlying bio-
technology to develop coherent and useful definitions of chimeras."
Moreover, scientific understanding reveals how rapid advances in bio-
technological techniques shape the ethical and legal discourse regard-
ing chimera regulation. 27 For example, complex biotechnology enables
scientists to increase the human composition of chimeras dramatically,
thus dismantling traditional concepts of species and personhood. 28 As a
result, biotechnological differences suggest that certain technology may
contravene the public welfare and human dignity, whereas other tech-
nology generates less concern.29
A. Traditional Methods for Crossing Species Boundaries
Scientists have been crossing species boundaries for decades by
transferring specific genes" and other materials from one species to
25 See infra notes 208-249 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 250-296 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 297-387 and accompanying text.
26 See teRESIDENT'S COUNCIL. ON BIOS TICS, HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNM: AN
ETHICAL INQUIRY 37-55 (2002) [hereinafter HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY) (CITh
phasiziug the importance of accurate terminology to prevent distortion and ambiguity in the
discussion of human cloning), available at http://iww.bioethics.govireports/cloningre-
port/pcbe_cioning_report.pdf.
27 See Robert & Baylis, supra note 3, at I.
28 Sec id. at 4-5; Michael D. Rivard, Comment, Toward a General Theory of Constitutional
Person hood: A Theory of Constitutional Posonhood for Transgenic Humanoid Species, 39 UCLA L.
lbw. 1425,1431 (1992) (asserting that present doctrines cannot address issues of person-
hood raised by emerging technology involving novel humanoid organisms).
29 See Greely, supra note 2, at 19; Josephine Johnston & Christopher Eliot, Chimeras and
"Human Dignity", 3 A. J. Ihournics W6, W6-7 (2003), at http://mitpress.mit/edu/
journals/ajob/3/3/w6.pdf.
30 A gene is - [t]he functional and physical unit of heredity passed from parent to off-
spring. Genes are pieces of DNA, and most genes contain the information for making a
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another.31 Conventional technologies include animal breeding to
produce hybrids, such as mules; 32 interspecies organ donation;" and
genetic recombination techniques. 34 hiterspecies organ donation, or
xenotransplantation, emerged several decades ago as an attempt to
remedy the insufficient number of human organ donors. 35 Research-
ers hope that, in the future, specially bred animals will provide an
abundant supply of organs for human recipients."
Scientists modify donor animals using genetic engineering tech-
niques such as genetic recombination, which involves the transfer of
genes from one species to another. 37 Scientists have used recombinant
DNA techniques to express human proteins in lower life forms, in-
cluding bacteria." Subsequent innovations have allowed scientists to
specific protein." NAT'L HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH INST., TALKING GLOSSARY or GENETIC
TERMS, at hup://www.genome.gov/glossary.cfm?key=gene  (last visited Apr. 1, 2004). DNA,
or deoxyribonucleic acid, is the primary genetic material of most organisms. Eileen Morin,
Of Mice and Men: The Ethics of Patenting Animals, 5 HEA1:111 U. 147, 149 (1997). DNA is the
component of genes that may be spliced and recombined in various ways in genetic engi-
neering. Id.
51 See NATI, 1110171111CS ADVISORY COMM'N, CLONING HUMAN BEINGS: REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS or THE NATIONAL RIOE'EllICS ADVISORY COMMISSION 1 (1997), avail-
able at http:/ /wwwgeorge town .eduiresearch/nrchl/n bac/pubs/clon ingl/cloning,pdf;
Rokosz, supra note 9, at 472 (discussing the process of using bacteria to replicate human
DNA and manufacture proteins); infra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
32 Mules are hybrids of male donkeys and female horses that may occur naturally with-
out ethical concern. Greely, supra note 2, at 19.
33 See infra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
34 See infin notes 37-41 and accompanying text; see also David Castle, Hopes Against
Hopeful Monsters, 3 Am. .1. Blom' tcs, Su miner 2003, at 29,29 (suggesting conventional and
unconventional chimeras raise the same ethical concerns to varying degrees).
35 Fritz H. Bach et al., Ethical and Legal Issues in Technology: Xenotransplantation, 27 Am.
j.L. & MED. 283,284-85 (2001). Several patient deaths in the 19605 and 1970s stalled sci-
entists' initial efforts to harvest organs from animal donors for use as substitutes for hut-
man organs. Id. Research accelerated in the 1980s following advances to prevent organ
rejection, including new drugs to suppress the inuntme system and procedures to modify
donor animals genetically. Id.
Sce id. at 285.
37 Sec Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property in Higher Lift Forms: The Patent System and Con-
troversial Technologies, 47 MD. 1,. REV. 1051,1053 (1988); Morin, supra note 30, at 149; Rivard,
supra note 28, at 1434-36. Scientists have developed several recombination techniques, in-
cluding microinjection, cell fusion, electroporation, and retroviral infection. Morin, supra
note 30, at 149. In the most common technique, microinjection, scientists insert foreign
genes from one animal directly into the DNA of another animal, called a host. Merges, supra
at 1054. A portion of the inserted DNA will be taken into the host nucleus and will integrate
with the host DNA, thereby expressing the desired protein. Id.
38 See Greely, supra note 2, at 19. The public's moral ambivalence toward the creation
of bacteria-human chimeras may result from these chimeras' relative invisibility and dis-
similarity to human beings. See id.
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engineer uniquely human susceptibilities into mammals 39
 For exam-
ple, by the late 1980s, scientists refined recombinant DNA technology
to create mice that expressed human proteins° and mice that con-
tained entire human immune systems.'"
B. Modern Techniques to Create Chimeras
Recent advances in biotechnology have expanded the potential to
blend species beyond the limits of traditional transplantation and ge-
netic recombination techniques.° Innovations in stem cell research,
embryology, and cloning enable scientists to create modern chimeras,
which increasingly blur the line between human and animal.°
1. Fusing Stem Cells and Embryos to Produce Chimeras
The narrow scientific definition of chimera is an organism that
has at least two different populations of cells, which are genetically
distinct and originated from different fertilized eggs." Scientists typi-
cally create chimeras by mixing stem cells° (or embryos) from one
39 See Merges, supra note 37, at 1053-55. An example of this technique is described in
the first patent of a multicellular organism, known as the "Harvard Mouse," issued to
Philip Leder in 1988. See U .S . Patent No. 4,736,866 (issued April 12, 1988); JoAnne Eichel-
berger Seibold, Note, Can Chakrabarty Survive the "Harvard Mouse"?, 2 U. FLA. J .h. & Pun.
Pol.'s( 81, 81-83 (1998-1999) (describing a mouse engineered to contain cancer-causing
genes not normally found in mice). Following the success of the Harvard Mouse, scientists
engineered thousands of transgenic mice, which were discarded after their use in experi-
mental studies of cancer, HIV, and illnesses requiring animal research models. Merges,
supra note 37, at 1055; Mark Sagoff, Transgenic Chimems, 3 Ast. J. nl ics, Summer 2003,
at 29, 29.
40 Merges, supra note 37, at 1056. For example, in one experiment, researchers in-
serted the gene for the protein, tissue plasominogen activator (IPA). into female mice,
which began secreting tPA in their milk. Id. The researchers then used the tPA as a clot
dissolver for heart attack victims. Id.
41 Greely, supra note 2, at 19. For example, the SCID•hu mouse contains a complete
human immune system for the purpose of researching human immune functions. Id.
42 See infra notes 43-70 and accompanying text.
43 See Robert & Baylis, supra note 3, at 1, 6.
44
 COLO. STATE UNIV., CrIUGENEXICS AND CHROMOSOMAL DISORDERS: MOSAICISM
AND CHIMERISM, at imp://arbl.cvmbs.colostate.edaithooks/geneticsimedgen/chromo/
rnosaicslitml (last updated Aug. 5, 1998). Mosaic organisms, like chimeras, possess geneti-
cally different cells. Id. For example, people with Turner's Syndrome often possess a mix-
ture of normal cells and cells with chromosomal abnormalities. Id. Mosaicism differs from
chimerism, however, because all of the cells in the organism originate from a single fertil-
ized egg. Id.
45
 Stem cells are "undifferentiated multipotent precursor cells that are capable both of
perpetuating themselves as stem cells and of undergoing differentiation into one or more
specialized types of cells." HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY, „Topic note 26, at 233.
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species with early embryos of another species. 46 Each type of cell re-
tains its own character, such that the resulting chimera is a combina-
tion of mismatched parts.47 Because the DNA from each species ordi-
narily does not combine in this process, any offspring of the chimera
will contain DNA from just one of the original species.°
An indeterminate number of people are born as natural human-
human chimeras.49 These chimeric people possess two types of cells
containing different sets of DNA as a result. of a rare genetic anomaly
that is seldom detected." Scientists have manipulated this process in
animals to produce unnatural yet viable transgenic chimeras, begin-
ning with a goat-sheep chimera, or "geep,” in 1984. 51 Based on this suc-
cess, scientists proposed injecting human stem cells into mouse em-
bryos to test their pluripotency, or potential to develop into various
types of tissues.52 The researchers hypothesized that if the cells survived
and became pluripotent, they then would contribute to the formation
of all of the chimera's tissues, including germ line cells, which produce
eggs and sperm." Developmental biologists, however, were divided on
whether it was ethical to add human cells to developing animal em-
bryos.54 Nevertheless, this theory was tested in 2004, when researchers
40 See Robert & Baylis, supra note 3, at 8.
17 SARAII HARTWELL, HYBRID BIG CA'IS #1, at http://members.aol.com/jshartwell/
hybrid-manunals.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2004).
° Rivard, supra note 28, at 1437.
49 Helen Pearson, Dual Identities, 417 NATURE 1, 10-11 (2002). Typically, a chimeric
person was destined to be born a twin. Id. at 10. Due to a developmental anomaly, cells
from the twin became incorporated in the chimeric person's body in one of two ways: (1)
either the twin was spontaneously aborted, leaving embryonic blood cells that became part
of the chimeric person's bone marrow, or (2) the cells of the twin failed to separate at the
embryonic stage, so the chimeric person was born with some somatic cells containing DNA
from the twin. Id. Researchers have suggested that the incidence of natural human-human
chimeras has increased with the advent of in vitro fertilization (IVF) techniques. Id. at 11.
55 Id, at 10-11.
151 See Carole B. Felt illy et al., Mterspecifie Chimacrism Between Sheep and Goat, 307 NATuRE
634, 634-36 (1984). The "geep" was the first chimeia created in the United States. Id. at
634. The structure of its legs and skull were goat-like, but it had the frame of a sheep with
curly wool and patches of short, coarse hair. See id. at 635-36.
52 Natalie DeWitt, Biologists Divided over Proposal to Create Human-Mouse Embryos, 420
NA'111RE 255, 255 (2002).
55 Sec id.; Robert & Baylis, supra note 3, at 8.
54 DeWitt, supra note 52, at 255. Ultimately, despite the ethical debate, scientists inserted
neural stem cells from ten-week-old human fetuses into the brain of a live mouse, after which
the human cells survived and populated various regions of the mouse brain. Lisa M. Krieger,
Thading New Ethical Ground, Scientists Put a Bit of Man into a Mouse, MERCURY NEws,
h ttp: / /www.sil iconval ley.com/m1d/siliconval ey/4700 00.h inOtemplate= con ten Modules/
printstoryjsp (posted Dec. 9, 2002). Scientists had conducted other experiments grafting
human embryonic stem cells onto early chick embryos. See Ronald S. Goldstein et al., Integra-
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produced human-pig chimeras by injecting human stem cells into de-
veloping pig embryos.55
 The developing pigs contained both human
and porcine cells, and surprisingly, some cells fused spontaneously to
incorporate both human and pig DNA. 56
2. Cloning to Produce Human-Nonhuman Embryos
Policymakers and ethicists often reference other interspecies com-
binations, such as hybrids, when discussing chimeras." Hybrids are cre-
ated when an egg and a sperm from different but closely-related species
join to form a single zygote.58 Although scientists create hybrids in the
laboratory, they also combine material from different species into a
single cell using cloning59 techniques.60 These human-nonhuman em-
don and Differentiation of Human Embryonic Stem Cells Transplanted to the Chick Embryo, 225 DE-
VELOPMENTAL DYNAMICS 1, 80-86 (2002).
55
 Brenda M. Ogle et al., Spontaneous Fusion of Cells Between Species Yields Transdifferentia-
don and Retroviral Transfer in Vivo, 18 FED'N Aht. SOCVS FOR EXPERIMENTAL BIOLOGY J. 548,
548-50 (2004) (condensed version available in print; full text of prepublication version
published online Jan. 8, 2004, available at http://www.fasebj.org). In January 2004, scien-
tists created human-pig chitneras by injecting human stem cells derived from adult bone
marrow donors into forty-clay-old pig fetuses. Id. Of the surviving human stem cells, about
sixty percent became incorporated into the porcine tissue. Id.
56 See id. Researchers did not anticipate that cells from each species would fuse in this
manner to create hybrid cells with two sets of DNA. See Gala Vince, NewScientist.com,
Pig-Human Chimeras Contain Cell Surprise, at http://www.newscientist.cominews/news .
jsp?id=ns99994558 (Jan. 13, 2004). The United States Patent and Trademark Office (the
"USPTO") rejected a proposal to create human-nonhuman chimeras using a similar tech-
nique. See infra notes 107-121 and accompanying text.
57 See, e.g., Assisted Human Reproduction Act, ch. 2, §§ 3, 5(1), 2004 S.C. (Can.)
(defining and regulating both hybrids and chimeras); Robert & Baylis, supra note 3, at 8-9
(featuring both hybrids and chimeras in bioethical discussion). Embryos produced
through interspecies nuclear transfer fall within this Note's broad analysis of single bio-
logical entities composed of a mixture of materials from two or more organisms possessing
distinct genetic backgrounds. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
58
 HARWELL, supra note 47. A zygote is 1 tl he diploid cell that results from the fertili-
zation of an egg cell by a sperm cell." HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNFIY, supra note
26, at 233. Diploid "[defers to the chromosome number in a cell, distinct for each species
(forty-six in human beings).' Id. at 230.
" Cloning involves the insertion of DNA from a body cell (somatic cell) into an egg
from which the nucleus has been removed. See generally HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN
DK:NITS', supra note 26, at 57-71. Scientists use chemicals or electricity to stimulate cloned
embryos to begin dividing as would an egg fertilized by a sperm. Id. at 60. If scientists join
a somatic cell nucleus from one species and an egg cell from another species, then each
cell in the resulting organism will contain materials from both species. Id. at 58-59.
6° See Robert & Baylis, supra note 3, at 8. Organisms produced using cloning tech-
niques are not technically hybrids because they are not created from eggs and sperm. See
HART WELL, supra note 47. These organisms are not technically chimeras either, because all
of their cells are genetically identical. See Coto. STATE UNIV., supra note 44.
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bryos raise some of the same profound ethical questions as traditional
chimeras.61 For example, following the first human-nonhuman nuclear
transfer62 in 1998, President Bill Clinton indicated that lie was "'deeply
troubled'" by the human-nonhuman nuclear transfer and asked the
National Bioethics Advisory Board to investigate the research .° In the
procedure at issue, scientists at a private biotechnology company fused
the nuclei of human body cells with cow eggs from which the nuclei
had been removed." Only one of the resulting embryos, which con-
tained 99% human DNA from the transferred human nucleus and I%
cow DNA from the egg's mitochondria, 65 developed past. the sixteen-
cell stage.6°
In 2003, scientists in China removed the DNA from the nuclei of
rabbit eggs and replaced it with DNA from human body cells. 67 The
scientists then allowed the embryos to develop for several days before
61 See Robert & Baylis, supra note 3, at 8.
62 Nuclear transfer means Itiransferring the nucleus with its chromosomal DNA from
one (donor) cell to another (recipient) cell. In clotting, the recipient is a human egg cell
and the donor cell can be any one of a number of different adult tissue cells." PitEsmEtsrr's
COUNCIL ON BIOFFIIICS, REPRODUCTION AND RESPONSIBILITY: Till: REGULATION OF NEW
TECHNOLOGIES 232, at http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/reproductionandresponsibility/
_pche_prepub_reproduction and_responsibilitypdf (forthcoming 2004) [hereinafter RE-
PRODUCTION AND REseuNstutt,rrd.
63 SceTranscript, Nat'l Bioethics Advisory Comm'n, 25th Meeting (Nov. 17, 1998), at 3,
99, available at http://www.georgetmmeduiresearch/nrchi/nbacitranscripts/nov98/
day_l.pdf. Professor Ralph L. Brinster, a veterinary scientist at the University of Pennsylva-
nia, indicated that transgenic organisms produced through nuclear transfer are probably
not chimeras. Id. at 102-03.
64 Seejose E. Cibelli et al., Somatic CCII Nuclear Transfer in Humans: Pronit clear and Early
Embryonic Development, 2,1. REGENERATIVE MED, 25. 25-31 (2001); see also Robert P. Lanza et
al., Human Therapeutic Cloning, 5 NATURE 1MED, 963, 975 (1999) (discussing benefits of cow-
human in terspecies nuclear transfer research).
65 Mitochondria are "[s]mall energy-producing organelles inside of cells." HUMAN
CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNriv, supra note 26, at 232. Mitochondria replicate by creating a
copy of their short mitochondria] DNA sequence, so that each of the two resulting mito-
chondria receives a copy. Id.
26 See Lanza et al.. supra note 64, at 975.
07 ling Chen et. al., Embryonic Stem Cells Generated by Nuclear Transfer of Human Somatic
Nuclei into Rabbit Oocytes, 13 CELL RESEARCH 251-64 (2003), available at hup://www.cell-
research.com/20034/034-chzb.pdf; see also Carina Dennis, China: Stem Cells Rise in the East,
419 NATURE 323, 334-36 (2002). In the experiment, scientists removed the nuclei from
human cells that were extracted from tissues discarded after surgeries on male and female
children and adults. Rick Weiss, Cloning Yields Human-Rabbit Hybrid Embryo, WAsn. PosT,
Aug. 14, 2003, at A04. The scientists then transplanted the nuclei into New Zealand rabbit
eggs and allowed them to develop to the embryonic stage. Id. The rabbit DNA repro-
grammed the human DNA to multiply and develop into embryos that contained both the
nuclear human genome and mitochondria! rabbit DNA. Id.
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they destroyed them °a Researchers claim that these techniques may
yield embryonic stem cells, from which they hope to produce cells and
tissues for human transplantation. 69 This research raises additional
concerns, however, because if the experiments were continued, they
might lead to the development of human-nonhuman beings."
II. ETHICAL AND LEGAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR CHIMERA REGULATION
Notwithstanding concerns about the void of legal authority con-
trolling the development of chimera technology in the United States,
there is also no consensus about which, if any chimeras should be regu-
lated:71 The arguments for and against the regulation of chimeras in-
volve two traditions of Western philosophy." The first philosophy, the
deontotogical approach, evaluates the inherent rightness or wrongness
of an action without regard to the consequences." The second phi-
losophy, the utilitarian approach, weighs the benefits and harms of an
action without judging its morality. 74
 Arguments for and against chi-
mera regulation implicate both philosophies."
68 Weiss, supra note 67, at A04. The researchers did not allow the embryos to live beyond
fourteen days, which is in accord with the standard originally set forth by the United King-
dom's Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Hunan Fertilisation and Embryology (the
'Warnock Report"). Sec DEPAR13tENT or HEALTH & SOCIAL SECURrrY, REPORT OF "HIE COM-
M rITEE OF INQUIRY INTO HUMAN FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY, 1984, Crnnd. 9314, at 66,
http://www.boperis.ac.uk/img1984/ref2900_1_1.1aal; Weiss, supra note 67, at A04. The
Warnock Report led to the United Kingdom's criminalization of experiments that involve
plating human embryos into animal bodies or mixing human gametes with animal gametes
without a license. See Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, c. 37, §§3(3)(b),
4(1) (c) (U.K.), http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1990/  U kpgai 9900037_en1 Jain.
" See Lanza et al., supra note 64, at 975.
70 See id. But sce Janet L. Dolgin, Embryonic Discourse: Abortion, Stem Crlls , and Cloning, 31
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 101, 113-14 (2003) (suggesting that although nuclear transfer experi-
ments reinforced public concern about the creation of hutnan-nonhuman beings, such as
a cow-person, the promise of embryonic stem cell research generated responses in favor of
cloning for research purposes).
71 See infra notes 205-207 and accompanying text (describing changes in the Presi-
dent's Council's interim recommendations to Congress regarding which types of chimera
creations Congress should prohibit); see also Thomas A. Magnani, The Patentability of Hu-
man-Animal Chimeras, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 443, 444-15 (1999) (recommending that
"biotechnology should be regulated, if at all, by Congress directly") (emphasis added).
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A. Deontologicat Arguments
The primary ethical objections to making human chimeras are
deontological.78 Deontological arguments include, for example, empha-
sis on the dignity of humanity or stewardship over other beings." In
light of the special dignity afforded' to the human embryo, deontologists
might advocate a ban on chimeras' made using human embryos. 78 Also,
deontologists might object to sonic future uses of chimeras, which al-
though purely speculative, indicate the type of unrestrained scientific
experimentation that the government. might intervene to prevent.79 For
example, researchers may create future human-nonhuman chimeras for
nonmedical, elective purposes such as to delay aging and to enhance
human capabilities. 8° These efforts to create chimeras for nontherapett-
tic purposes might raise deontological objections based on assertions of
their intrinsic wrongness. 81
B. Utilitarian Arguments
Utilitarians might find that the benefits of creating human-
non human chimeras for medical and pharmaceutical research out-
weigh any harmful results. 82 Human-nonhuman chimeras are increas-
ingly valuable to pharmaceutical companies for studying the benefits
of new drugs.83 Currently, FDA regulations require pharmaceutical
companies to test new drugs extensively on animals before they may
be tested on humans; however, drugs that produce a beneficial effect
76 Sec Magnani, supra note 71. at 456-58 (criticizing patent law's moral utility test as
applied to technology, because it weighs beneficial uses more heavily than abstract moral
objections to chimeras).
77 See id. at 457.
78 See Samuel B. Casey & Nathan A. Adams IV, Specially Respecting the Living Human Em-
bryo by Adhering to Standard Human Subject Experimentation Rules, 2 YALE J. EA1: nt 1 1 01:Y,
& Emir:8 111, 118-19 (2001) (suggesting that human embryos be given special respect in
research and he subject to guidelines for human experimentation instead of policies for
the use of human issues); Magnani, supra note 71, at 457.
79 See Newman, supra note 16, at 457-61 (discussing the risks of unlimited human de-
velopmental manipulation).
88 See, e.g.Julian Savulescu, Human-Animal Transgenesis and Chimeras Alight Be an Expres-
sion of Our Humanity, 3 Am. j. Blorrnics, Summer 2003, at 22,22-24 (advocating the crea-
tion of chimeras when there are rational reasons to do so or when genetic modification
will improve human reasoning, because such purposes are expressions of humanity).
81 See Magnani, supra note 71, at 457. For example, an experiment involving human-
human hermaphroditic chhneras produced strong ethical objections in relation to the rela-
tively weak beneficial use of the research. See infra notes 350-352 and accompanying text.
82 See Magnani, supra note 71, at 456.
83 Id.
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for animals may not produce the same effect in humans &t The crea-
tion of human-nonhuman chimeras would make this process more
efficient, because researchers could evaluate the direct effect of new
drugs on the human cells of chimeras.85
Human-nonhuman chimeras also offer promise in organ trans-
plantation. 96
 Humans are less likely to reject organs harvested from
chimeras than from animal donors, because animal hearts and kid-
neys grown partly from human cells in chimeras would resemble the
recipient's organs more closely. 87 Chimeras are also useful in studies
of human development.e8 Given that scientists have already produced
human-rabbit chimeras as sources of stem. cells, 99 utilitarians might
support adding pluripotent animal stem cells to developing human
embryos to test for immunological resistance to disease." Similarly,
utilitarians might urge the isolation of gene sequences from animals
resistant to diseases such as HIV for introduction into the human ge-
nome to confer HIV resistance. 91
A more radical utilitarian approach might support creating chi-
meras for human genetic enhancement.92 Researchers could add
animal genes to the human genome to confer new traits or to delay
aging; for example, increasing human night vision by adding genes
from nocturnal animals or combating human telomere" degradation
by adding genes from long-living creatures 9 4
 At the same time, the




87 Magnani. supra note 71, at 456.
sa See id.
89 See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
" See Savulescu, 51111,17 note 80, at 22.
91 See id.
92 For a discussion of enhancement, see generally PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOLTIIIGS,
BEYOND THERAPY: BIOTECHNOLOGY AND 'HIE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS (2003), available at
http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/beyondtherapy/heyond_thempy final_report_pcbe.pdf,
which analyzes the potential for biotechnology to enhance human health and performance.
93 A telomere is "Wile segment at the end of each chromosome arm which consists of a
series of repeated UNA sequences that regulate chromosomal replication at each cell divi.
sion. Some of the telomere is lost each time a cell divides, and eventually, when the telonaere
is gone, the cell dies." U.S. NAT'L LIBRARY OF MED. ET Al.., GENETICS HOME REFERENCE:
GLOSSARY, at http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/ghr/glossary/telomere  (published Mar. 26, 2004).
94
 See Sartilescu, supra note 80, at 22.
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posed experiments would introduce unpredictable and harmful ani-
mal genes into the human germ line. 95
III. THE POTENTIAL TO REGULATE CHIMERAS THROUGH
EXISTING INSTITUTIONS
Although scientists have been creating human-nonhuman chi-
meras for several decades, advances in embryology and cloning have
pushed this technology in new directions.90 These unprecedented de-
velopments in biotechnology have generated public debate; however,
most research involving early human life is unregulated,97 aside from
limitations on federal funding for stem cell research.98 For example,
there are no federal laws regulating privately funded embryo re-
search99 and no significant. restrictions on human cloning or the pur-
suit of inheritable genetic modifications.'"
A. Chimera Regulation Through Patent Law
Particularly in the area of intellectual property law, practitioners
have urged Congress to resolve the debate over which forms of life are
patentable. 101 The issue arose in the 1980 decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Diamond v. Chahrabarty, which established
95 See Paul R. Billings et al., Human Ge•mline Gene Modification: A Dissent, 353 Tim E LAN-
CET 1811, 1873-74 (1999) (asserting legal, ethical, and scientific justifications for prohibit-
ing the genetic manipulation of germ cells, such as the absence of a clinical need and the
risk of unpredicted effects that will persist in subsequent generations).
go See Robert & Baylis, supra note 3, at 1.
97 See REPRODUCTION AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 62, at 129 (discussing indirect
regulation of assisted reproductive technologies); Discussion Document, President's
Council on Bioethics: U.S. Public Policy and the Biotechnologies That Touch the Begin-
nings of Human Life: A Detailed Overview (June 13. 2003), http://www.bioethics.gov/
background/biotechnology.litnil (concluding that the federal government has no mean-
ingful regulation over the scientific manipulation of human embryos).
98 See, e.g.. Bush, supra note 10, at 1151 (restricting federal funding for stem cell re-
search to the use of existing cell lines).
°See REPRODUCTION AND RESPONSIB um -Y. supra note 62, at 132.
m° See George J. Annas et al., Ptvtecting the Endangered Human: Toward an International
Treaty Prohibiting Cloning and Inheritable Alterations, 28 An. J.L. & MED. 151, 168 (2002).
Professor Annas recommends an international ban on reproductive cloning and inherit-
able germ line modifications. Id. at 151-52.
101 See Gitlin, supra note 16, at 521 (indicating that the issue of patent protection for
1111111.1M-31011111.1111.1/1 chimeras will remain unresolved unless Congress intervenes); Chimera
Patent Application Holds Mirror to Biotech Society, GENEWATcn (Council for Responsible Ge-
netics, Cambridge, Mass.), July 1998, at 2 [hereinafter GENEWATtat) (Stuart Newman sug-
gesting that the U.S. Supreme Court could resolve the patentability of human-nonhuman
chimeras).
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that a genetically engineered bacterium was a patentable ivention.'"
The Court stated that Congress intended for patentable subject mat-
ter to "include anything under the sun that is made by man," but for it
to exclude ideas as well as laws and processes of nature.'" Despite ar-
guments that this holding might lead to the patenting of a "gruesome
parade of horribles," the Court indicated that Congress could make
the determination of which lifeforms are not patentable. 10" The cur-
rent debate involves those who believe that no one should possess the
exclusive rights to living organisms,'" including chimeras, and those
who hope to secure patents on humans and nonhuman combinations
for the generation of stem cells and tissues.'"
1. The Role of United States Patent and Trademark Office in
Patenting Chimeras
In the years since Chakrabarty, the U.S. patent system has become a
maelstrom of controversy regarding human-nonhuman chimeras. 1 °7
1997, cellular biologist Stuart Newman,'" with support from biotech-
nology activist, Jeremy Riflin, 109
 filed an enterprising patent application
to force the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (the "USPTO") to de-
cide whether chimeras containing up to fifty percent human DNA are
patentable subject matter (the "Newman patent").m The application
provoked immediate public debate over what it means to be human
and whether the USPTO should be an arbiter of morality in biotech-
nolog-y. 11 ' Rifkin and Newman's objective was not to create the chime-
ras, but rather to secure the exclusive right to the technology for twenty
102 447 U.S. 303. 309 (1980) (holding bacteria designed to consume oil is patentable
subject matter).
1 " Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)).
104 Id. at 316, 318.
1 °5 See GENENVATial, supra note 101, at 3 (describing the No Patents on Life movement).
1" See, e.g., World Intellectual Property Organization, Intl Publ'n No. WO 98/07841
(published Feb. 26, 1998) (process patent for creating human-cow embryo); see also . supra
notes 64-66 and accompanying- text.
107 See generally Dashka Slater, HuMousem, LEGAL. AFFAIRS, Nov.—Dec. 2002, at 21,
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/November-December-2002/feature_slater_novdec2002.html.
108 Stuart Newman is a cellular biologist at New York Medical College and founding
member of the Council for Responsible Genetics. Id.
1 °9 Jeremy Rifkin is an author and economist as well as the president of the Founda-
tion for Economic Trends. Id. at 1.
n° See id. at 22.
111 Id. The chimeras described in the patent application include human combinations
with mice, chimpanzees, pigs, and baboons. Id. at 1. The patent application suggests three
methods for mixing human and animal embryos. which could be implanted in a human or
animal uterus. Id. at 2.
2004]	 Regulating Human-Nonhu man Chimeras	 633
years after the patent was granted, or, if the patent was denied, to re-
duce the economic incentive for others to develop chimeras. 112 The
USPTO denied the patent application in 1999; 113 however, Newman
and Rifkin have continued to appeal.'"
Originally, the USPTO denied the Newman patent because it
claimed that the invention "embrace[d] a human being." 15 When
Newman and Rifkin asked the USPTO to identify the legal basis for
banning their patent, the USPTO stated that. the Newman patent
would violate the Thirteenth Amendment, which forbids slavery and
the ownership of human heings. 116 The USPTO has maintained that it
will not grant patents on human life nor for the processes to create
human life; however, it no longer relies on the Thirteenth Amend-
ment as its reason. 1 " Instead, the USPTO has revived the beneficial-
utility doctrine, originally set forth by Justice Joseph Story, 118 which
Was used to deny patents on gambling devices and early medical
frauds." 9 In denying the Newman patent., the USPTO interpreted the
utility requirement to exclude inventions deemed to be "injurious to
the well being, good policy, or good morals of society."12° Accordingly,
112 See Slater, supra note 107, at 2.
115 See id. at 27.
n 4 See Aaron Zither, Patently Provoking a Debate, L.A. TIMES, May 12. 2002, at Al.
115 The USPTO initially rejected the Newman patent application, stating it. "embraces a
human being. In particular, applicant's claimed invention ... is not limited to non-humans
but rather includes within its scope a human being and as such falls outside the scope of
protection." Sec Patent Application Is Disallowed as 'Embracing' Human Being, 58 PAT. TitAm:-
MARK & CoevRworr j., June 17, 1999, at 203, 203. The USPTO regulations state that "Jiff
the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claimed invention as a whole encompasses a
human being, then a rejection under 35 U.S.C. 101 must be made indicating that the
claimed invention is directed to nonstatutory subject matter." U.S. PATENT OvricE, DEloT
OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OE PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2105 (8th ed. 2001), available
at http://www.nspto.gov/web/offices/pacimpep/mpep_e8r1_2100_508.pdf.
116 Sec U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; Slater, supra note 107, at 26; Zither, supm note 114, at
Al.
117 See Nathan A. Adams. Creating Clones, Kids Cc' Chimera: Liberal Democratic Compromise
at the Crossroads, 17 Ncrritt: DAME	 & NAL Poifle 71, 131 (2003).
118 Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1018-19 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568) (seminal
case in finding certain non-useful inventions unpatentable); Adams, supra note 117, at
131-32.
119 See generally ROBERT P. MERGES CT AL., INTELLECIUAL PROPERTY IN TOE NEW Tncii-
NOLUGICAI. AGE 142-44 (3d ed. 2003).
129 See Media Advisory, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office. Facts on Patenting Life Forms
Having a Relationship to Humans (Apr. 1, 1998) (quoting ToI-O-Matic, Inc. v. Prorna
Product-und Marketing Gesellschaft M.h.11., 945 F.2d 1546, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citing
Lowell, 15 F. Cas. at 1019 (Story, j.))), http://wwwitspto.gov/web/offices/com/speeclies/
98-06.hun; Adams, supra note 117, at 132.
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by declaring certain human-nonhuman chimeras unpaten table, the
USPTO appears willing to set normative standards for biotechnology. 12 a
2. Absence of Public Morality in U.S. Patent Law
The moral utility doctrine, as implemented by the USPTO, differs
from European patent laws, which explicitly address the moral status of
the human embryo in biotechnology. 122 In 1998, the European Parlia-
ment and the Council of the European Union issued a directive that
forbids patents on inventions that contravene the "ordre public," or
public morality. 123 The Preamble to the Directive sets forth that "proc-'
esses to produce chimeras from germ cells or totipotent cells of hu-
mans and animals, are obviously also excluded from patentability."124
 In
.contrast, the role of the embryo in U.S. abortion law 125
 and the lack of
public consensus on the moral status of the embryo 126 would compli-
cate any attempt to model chimera regulation after the European pat-
ent system. 12'
3. The Role of Congress in Regulating Biotechnology Patents
In addition to policy decisions by the USPTO, Congress may use
its statutory authority to withhold the issue of patents for certain dan-
121 Sec Adams, supra note 117, at 132 (presenting view that the USPTO may not be
suited to making judgments about biotechnology); see also Duane Nash, Recommended Re-
sponse for Human Cloning Patent Applications. 42 IDEA 279, 299 (2002) (asserting that tinder
the U.S. Constitution, the regulatory role to discourage unwanted scientific developments
belongs to Congress).
'" See Council Directive 98/44, art. 6, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 13, 18 [hereinafter Council
Directive 98/44], available at hup://europa.en.int/eur4ex/pri/en/oydat/1998/1_213/
1_21319080730en00130021.pdf; sec also Adams, supra note 117, at 123-27; Magnani, supra
note 71, at 453-54.
123 See Council Directive 98/44, art. 6.1, at 16. Under the Directive, technology that is
offensive to the ordre public includes processes to clone humans, processes to alter the
human germ line, commercial or industrial uses of human embryos, processes to geneti-
cally alter animals which cause unnecessary suffering without any substantial medical
benefit, and the animals used in such processes. Id. art. 6.2, at 18-19.
' 24 Id. para. 38, at 16.
125 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156-59 (1973) (rejecting the view that embryos are
legal persons in abortion context). For a comparison of abortion laws in the United States
and Europe. see generally Teresa Nicholson, Comment, European Abortion Law: An Analysis
and Comparison of Abortion Law in the a ropean Union and the United States, 24 COME. L. REV,
573, 573-86 (1994).
126 See infra notes 275-285 and accompanying text.
127 See Magnani, supra note 71, at 457.
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gerous technologies. 128 For example, under the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, the Department of Defense must review all patent applications
regarding atomic energy to determine whether an invention has
weapon potential.' If the invention only has defense-related poten-
tial, then the Department of Defense may assert a monopoly over the
technology and may take the rights to the invention in exchange for
compensation.'" Congress has not considered chimeras to be of
equal danger to atomic weaponry at this time." 1
Nevertheless, in 2004, Congress passed a provision of the federal
budget that prohibited the USPTO from issuing patents on human
organisms." 2 The provision codifies the USPTO's current position
against granting patents for genetically engineered human beings,
fetuses, and embryos. 1" The provision, however, will not affect the
patenting and marketing of DNA'sequences, cell lines, stem cells, tis-
sues, and other biological produCts of human origin.'" In addition,
the provision does not prevent scientists from seeking patents for pro-
cesses to create biological products. 1 "
128 See, e.g., Atomic Energy Act of 1954. 42 U.S.C. § 2181 (2000). Similarly, Congress
has withheld the issue of patents for sensitive national security information. See Invention
Secrecy Act of 1951, 35 U.S.C. §§ 181-188 (2000).
I" See 42 U.S.C. § 2181; Adams, supra note 117, at 132.
' 3° See 42 U.S.C. § 2181; Adams, supra note 117, at 132.
131 Sec Merges, supra note 37, at 1066-67 (contrasting nuclear weapons with recombi-
nant DNA technology and concluding that a patent ban is appropriate for nuclear weap-
ons because they have no alternative useful purpose and raise national security concerns
rather than moral concerns, whereas biotechnology patents serve beneficial uses).
132 Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 634, 118 Stat 101
(swing succinctly that "InIone of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available under
this Act may be used to issue patents on claims directed to or encompassing a human
organism"), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.govicgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbnamer-- 108_
cong_public_lawsitalocid=fipubll99.108.pdf; see also Amy Fagan. House Will Ibte on Patent Ban
for Human Life Forms; Biotechnology Firms Support Tim ES, Dec. 8. 2003, at A08.
' 53 Rick Weiss, Hill Negotiators Agree to Bar Patents for Human Organisms, WAsii. PosT,
Nov. 25, 2003, at A19. Representative David Weldon, a physician who sponsored the provi-
sion, stated that it would codify the USPTO's existing, rule that human organisms are not
subject to patents. See id. The Director of the USPTO confirmed that the provision's lan-
guage "does not alter the USPTO policy on the nonpatentability of human life-forms at
any stage of development and is fully consistent with our policy." Letter from James E.
Rogan. Director, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, to Hon. Ted Stevens, Chairman,
Conunittee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate 2 (Nov. 20, 2003), available at lutp://www.nr1c.
org/Killing_Embryos/Human_Patenting/WeldonamendUSPTO.pdf  [hereinafter Rogan
Letter].
134 Weiss, supra note 133, at A19.
133 Id.
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As a result, this provisionary ban allows the USPTO to continue
to address new or borderline issues, including chimeras)" The
USPTO already grants patents on animals that have been modified to
include a few human genes for the production of a human protein or
antibody; however, it remains unclear under the provision which chi-
meras are so humanlike that they cannot he patented, such as the
human-chimpanzee chimera described in the Newman patent appli-
cation)" The USPTO Director stated that the provision gives "une-
quivocal congressional backing" for the USPTO's refusal "to grant any
patent containing a claim that encompasses any member of the spe-
cies Homo sapiens at any stage of development," which suggests that
chimeras created from human embryos may not. qualify for patent
protection) 38 Nevertheless, in denying the Newman patent, the
USPTO did not explain its determination that chimeras containing
less than fifty percent human DNA encompass a human being and
therefore are unpatentable) 39 Hence, the interpretive question re-
mains: How many human gene sequences are needed for the USPTO
to decide that a chimera is human?"°
138 Sec 149 CONG. REC. E2234 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 2003) (statement of Rep. Weldon).
Weldon explained that the patent ban does not affect the patentability of human-animal
chimeras:
What about an animal that is modified to include a few human genes so it can
produce a human protein or antibody? What about a human/animal ''chi-
mera" (an embryo that is half human, half animal)? The fact is, these ques-
tions are not new. The USPTO has already granted patents on the former. It
has also thus far rejected patents on the latter, the half-human embryo, be-
cause the latter can broadly but reasonably be construed as a human organ-
ism. The Weldon amendment does nothing to change this, but leaves the
USPTO free to address new or borderline issues on the same case-by-case ba-
sis as it already does.
Id. (citations omitted).
137 See id. The provision refers to the patenting of a "human organism" rather than the
patenting of a "human being." See Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 634, 118 Stat. 101; 149 CONG.
REC. E2234. Initially, this language raised suspicion among biotechnology groups, because
although they accepted a ban on the patenting of "hut= beings," they feared that the
language, "human organism," might be interpreted to mean a ban on the patenting of
biotechnology derived from human beings, such as embryonic stem cells, prosthetics, and
transgenic organisms. See id.; U.S. Takes Further Steps to Prevent Patenting of Human Beings, 23
Bunten L. REF., Feb. 2004, at 57, 57-58. Representative Weldon stressed that the lan-
guage was not meant to affect existing policies. See 149 CONG. REC. E2235.
138 See Rogan Letter, supra note 133, at 1.
139 See Nlagnani, supra note 71, at 449-50; supra notes 107-121 and accompanying text.
140 See Magnani, supra note 71, at 449-50. As described, the USPTO has not deter-
mined the percentage of human DNA that justifies patent prohibition. See id. The stance of
2004]	 Regulating Human-Nonhuman Chimeras 	 637
B. Administrative Regulation of Biotechnology as a
Model for Chimera Regulation
Current administrative regulations, as applied to animal and hu-
man subject research, provide a starting point to determine whether
biotechnology regulation in the United States may be expanded ade-
quately to encompass chimeras)" Multiple federal agencies regulate the
experimental and commercial uses of genetically modified animals) 42
In 1986, the Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology
(the "Framework") formalized this decentralized approach) 43 The
agencies listed in the Framework are governed by almost a dozen fed-
eral statutes, regulations, and guidelines)" No single agency, however,
provides for the comprehensive regulation of genetically modified or-
the USPTO that it will not grant patents on human life raises the question of at what point
a chimera is so humanlike that it cannot be patented. See id.
141 See Reagan Anne Kulseth. Note, Biotechnology and Animal Patents: When Someone
Builds a Better Mouse, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 691, 709, 711-12 (1990) (recommending that admin-
istrative regulation provides adequate management of biotechnology, including hutnan-
nonhuman hybrids).
142 OFFICE OF' 'am. ASSESSMENT, 101ST CONG., NEW DEVI:LE/MEWLS IN BIOTECHNOL-
OGY: PATENTING LIFE—SPECIAL. REPORT 110 (1989), available at http://www.wws.princeton.
ednicgi-bin/byteservpr1/-oei/disk1/1989/8924/8924.PDF; see also Kulseth, supra note 141,
at 712-14 (describing the administrative regulation of animals, research procedures, and
biotechnology products); Randy Vines, The Regulation of Biotechnology, BIOTECH. INFO., Pik
No. 443-006 (Va. Cooperative Extension, Blacksburg, Va.). May 2002, at 1-2, available at
http:/ /www.extvieduipubs/biotech/443-006/443-006.pdf.
143 See 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302-350 (June 26, 1986) (describing federal policies regulating
the safety of biotechnology research and products). The Office of Technology Assessment
(the "OTA") surveyed each agency listed in the Framework to determine the potential use
and regulation of genetically altered animals. OFFICE OF Trot. ASSESSMENT, supra note
142, at 102-10. Congress closed the OTA on September 29, 1995. OFFICE or Trott. As-
sEsstit ENT, 104T71 CONG., OTA ARCHIVE (Aug. 1996), http://www.access.gpo.gov/ota/.
144 OFFICE or Trot. ASSESSMENT, supra note 142, at 103-04. Nearly a dozen enabling
statutes give authority to these agencies, with some products regulated by mole than one
agency. See, e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide. and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136
(2000); Animal Welfare Act, id. §§ 2131-2159; Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, 15
U.S.C. §§ 2601-2656 (2000); Lacey Act Amendments of 1981. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378
(2000); Virus-Serum Toxin Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 151-159 (2000); Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act of 1938, id. §§ 301-397; Poultry Products Inspection Act, id. §§ 451-471;
Federal Meat Inspection Act. id. §§ 601-695; Endangered Species Act of 1973, 53 U.S.C.
§§ 1531-1544 (2000); MC also INST. OF LAB. ANIMAL RES., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
GUIDE FOR '111E CARE AND USE OF LABORATORY ANIMALS (7th ed. 1996). available at
htlp://1100k.S.Ilap.PC111/eXCCSIM1111_11C1f/5140,pdf; OFFICE Or LAB. ANIMAL WELFARE, NATI.
1NS1S. or HEALTH, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE POLICY ON HUMANE CARE AND USE OF
LA BORN1DRY AN IMALS (2002), available at http:/ /gran ts2.n .gov/gmn ts/olaw/
references/PHSPolicyLabAnimals.pdf.
638	 Boston College Law Review 	 [Vol. 45:619
ganisms, and none of the agencies address modern chimera technology
directly."5
Under the Framework, the FDA, the Environmental Protection
Agency, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture regulate the research,
development, and approval of biotechnology products. 118 The Frame-
work regulates these products according to their composition and pro-
posed uses, rather than by their method of production. 117 As a result,
cutting-edge biotechnology is subject to the same fragmented laws and
policies that govern conventional products."8
1. The FDA's Legal Mandate as Applied to Biotechnology Regulation
The FDA has claimed authority over various forms of assisted re-
productive technology, 149 although it has not added human-nonhuman
chimeras specifically to its jurisdiction.'" The FDA's legal mandate, as
conferred by Congress under the Commerce Clause, 151 authorizes it to
regulate the distribution of products linked to interstate commerce. 152
Although this mandate technically does not cover the direct regulation
of biotechnolop; the FDA may regulate a broad range of activities sur-
rounding the distribution of biotechnology products. 153
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (the "FFDC
Act") and the Public Health Services Act (the "PHS Act") set forth the
FDA's regulatory authority. 154 As an administrative agency, the FDA
may interpret these enabling statutes to accommodate circumstances
that Congress could not have predicted when originally drafting the
statutes. 155 In general, by working within its charters, an agency has
145 See OFFICE or TECH. ASSESSMENT, SUM note 142, at 110.
146 Vines, supra note 142, at 1. For example, the FDA regulates food products, human
and veterinary drugs, and medical devices, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture super-
vises efforts to enhance and protect agriculture. See OFFICE OF 'n:eil. Assissnimr, supra
note 112, at 106-08.
147 See Vines, supra note 142, at 1.
148 See id.
149 See, e.g., Rick Weiss, FDA to Regulate Certain Fertilization Procedures, WASH. PosT, July
II, 2001. at A02 (describing FDA's first effort to regulate the fertility field by overseeing
ooplasmic transfer technique).
159 See PAKENS & KNOWLES, supra note 7, at 12.
151 U.S. CONS'''. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
152
	
REPRoDucTioN AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 62, at 57; Rokosz, supra note 9,
at 492-95.
153 See Rokosz, supra note 9, at 493-94.
154 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397 (2000); Public
Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 201-300 (2000).
185
	 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844-45
(1984) (suggesting that reviewing courts will defer to an agency's attempts to modernize
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latitude to adapt to new challenges without requiring congressional
authority or instruction for each situation.'" As a consequence, an
agency may respond to new technology without risking that additional
legislation will disrupt existing policies.'" Congress's deference to
agencies, however, makes it difficult to predict which modernizing
efforts a reviewing court will permit and which it will nullify. 158
The FDA's jurisdiction includes one quarter of all consumer
products and encompasses modern biotechnologies, such as tissue
transplants, stem cell research, and human cloning.' 59 Despite the
limited expertise of FDA regulators in dealing with these emerging
areas of technology, the FDA has not sought congressional assistance
for an expansion of its statutory jurisdiction or for stronger adminis-
trative tools.' 5°
The FFDC and PHS Acts provide three possible mechanisms for
the FDA to assert jurisdiction over human-nonhuman chimeras and
other forms of emerging biotechnology. 161 Chimeras may be "biological
products" pursuant. to the PHS Act.'" Alternatively, chimeras may be
"drugs,' 1 °3 or the procedures used to create chimeras may be medical
"devices" under the FFDC Act.'" if the FDA has jurisdiction tinder
these statutes and their implementing regulations, then it must approve
an investigative new drug application before research may proceed. 165
Unauthorized research may be subject to criminal or civil sanctions. 166
unless it can be shown that Congress specifically prevented the agency from taking such
initiative); Richard A. Merrill, Human Tissues and Reproductive Cloning New Technologies
Challenge FDA, 3 Hous. J. & Poi'v I (2002), at Wt. 3 HOUJIALP 1, at .
156 See Merrill, supra note 155, at *1.
157 See id.
158 Id. at *2.
159 Id.
160 Id. at *3.
161 Elizabeth C. Price, Does the FDA Have Authority to Regulate Human Cloning?, 11 Ilmtv.
J.L. & TEcti. 619, 620 (1998); Rokosz. supra note 9, at 469-70.
162 Public Health Service Act § 351. 42 U.S.C. § 262(i) (2000).
ifL' Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 01'1938 § 201(g), 21 U.S.C. § 321(g) (1) (2000).
164 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 § 201(11), 21 U.S.C. § 321(h).
165 Price, .supra note 161, at 620.
166 Id. at 621; see. e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 333(f) (setting civil penalty for violating device re-
quirements of FFDC Act of up to $15,000 for each violation with a maximum of $I.000,000
per adjudication); 42 U.S.C. § 262(f) (setting fine of up to $500 or imprisonment of up to
one year, or both, for violating biological products requirements of the PHS Act).
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2. FDA Jurisdiction over Biotechnological Materials and Processes
Despite its broad discretion to interpret its charter, the FDA was
reluctant to extend its jurisdiction to human tissues. 167 Although in
the 1970s the FDA declared jurisdiction over porcine heart valves
used in xenotransplantation as biological materials, the FDA did not
extend its jurisdiction to human heart valves until many years later. 168
The FDA acknowledged that tissues could be regulated as drugs,
medical devices, or biotechnology products; however, it did not com-
mence regulation of human tissues until concerns about the transmis-
sion of infectious diseases, such as HIV, from donors to transplant re-
cipients compelled it to assert its regulatory authority. 169
The FDA was less hesitant to declare its jurisdiction over human
cloning, which it claimed through a series of informal expressions
made over several years, beginning with a remark in 1999 regarding
cloning as a form of gene therapy.'" Cloning, the FDA asserted, fell
under its biologics regulations, which primarily involve human gene
therapy and the medical manipulation and reinsertion of human
cells.'" The FDA suggested that it would regulate cloning for repro-
ductive purposes but not necessarily cloning for biomedical re-
search. 17" The FDA further stated that cloning to produce children
167 Merrill, supra note 155, at *9-52 (detailing the FDA's response toward regulation of
human tissue transplants).
168 Id. at *19-24.
169 Id. at *14-15, 24-26.
176 See Richard A. Merrill & Bryan]. Rose, FDA Regulation of Human Cloning: Usurpation
or Statesmanship, 15 El/my. J.L. TEcit, 85, 87-88 (2001); see also Richard A. Merrill, Remarks
at Meeting of the President's Council on Bioethics, Session 5: Biotechnology and Public
Policy: Role of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) (Jan. 17, 2003), http://www.
bioethics.gov/transcripts/jan03/session5.honl . The FDA's claim to jurisdiction over clon-
ing originated from statements Acting Conunissioner Michael Friedman made on a radio
call-in show in Washington, D.C. Id. The FDA backed up its assertion of jurisdiction
through communications with institutional review boards, congressional testimony; and
public statements. Id. Traditionally, the FDA asserts its authority by publishing a compre-
hensive discussion in the Federal Register which is available for public comment. Id. Accord-
ingly; in support of its jurisdiction over cloning, the FDA pointed to two statements that
representatives made in the Federal Register, one in 1993 regarding gene therapy and an-
other in 1997 regarding tissue and cellular therapies. Id.; sceRokosz, supra note 9, at 487.
171 See Rokosz, supra note 9, at 490.
172 CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC'Y & CHRISTIAN MED. & DENTAL AWN, COMMENTS ON STAFF
WORKING PAPER No. 8, AN UNNUMBERED STAFF WORKING PAPER ON REGULATING BM-
TECHNOLOGIF.S, AND SELECTED TRANSCRIPTS OF '111E PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOE'IIIICS
6 (2003) [hereinafter CHRIS•TAN LEGAL SOC . Y .1, available at http://www.clsnet.org/
clrfPages/advocacy/BioethicsComments.pdf.
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would require filing an investigational new drug application," 3 but it
was not prepared to grant such applications for cloning." 4
C. Assisted Reproductive Technology and Its Implications for
Chimera Regulation
In addition to regulation through patent law and agency oversight,
governments traditionally regulate reproductive biotechnology using
six general frameworks. 175 None of these regulatory mechanisms explic-
itly addresses chimeras; they serve as starting points for the regulation
of novel biotechnology, however. 176 The first framework avoids broad
legislation in favor of case by case judicial precedent, as exemplified by
legal decisions regarding the disposition of frozen embryos.'" This
form of regulation, which often incorporates oversight by institutional
review boards, is not comprehensive and varies by region. 178 Presently,
the only case law applicable to chimeras pertains to the USPTO's denial
of patents on human life)"
The second framework involves specific legislation for isolated
issues, such as legislation to prohibit or restrict a particular technol-
ogy.m The third scheme involves broader legislation directed at as-
sisted reproductive technology and typically encompasses the treat-
ment of embryos in research. 161 Canada's ALIR Act is an example of
broad assisted reproductive technology legislation that also encom-
passes chimeras. 182 The fourth regulatory scheme involves human sub-
175
	 Merrill, supra note 155, at *1. Researchers use investigational new drug applica-
tions as exemptions from the requirement of prior FDA approval for marketing and dis-
tributing drugs for use hi clinical trials. Id. at *4-6.
174 Sec CHRISTIAN LEGAL. SOC. ' S', supra note 172, at 2. Although the FDA may require
screening, registration, and similar mechanisms, it probably cannot prevent cloning to
produce children altogether. Id. Cloning to produce children may not be a health-related
treatment for disease pursuant to the FDA'S biologics, drugs, and device authority. Sec id.;
Rokosz, supra note 9, at 469-70.
175 Lori Knowles, The Hastings Ctr., Remarks at Meeting of the President's Council on
Bioethics, Fourth Meeting: Session 1: Regulation 2: Genetic and Reproductive Technologies:




m Id.; see, e.g., Davis v. Davis. 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that hus-
band's interest in avoiding parenthood following divorce outweighed wife's interest in
frozen embryos).
171/ Knowles, supra note 175.
179 See generally supra notes 101-140 and accompanying text.
190 See Knowles, supra note 175.
191 Id.
See generally Assisted Human Reproduction Act, ch. 2, 2004 S.C. (Can.).
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ject research legislation, which includes the use of embryos, fetal tis-
sue, and human beings. 183
 This framework includes institutional re-
view boards and a group of regulatory statutes for research on human
subjects, known as the Common Rttle. 184 The fifth scheme involves the
formation of an advisory panel or commission which typically devel-
ops a regulatory scheme. 185 The AHR Act provides for such an advi-
sory panel in regard to stem cell technology.' Finally, the most
common regulatory framework currently being applied to biotech-
nology is a combination of schemes. 187
1. The Deliberations of the President's Council on Bioethics
Like Canada, the President's Council on Bioethics (the "Presi-
dent's Council") incorporated chimeras into its discussions of assisted
reproductive technologies in the United States." 38 Beginning in 2002,
the President's Commit devoted considerable resources to examining
the governance of biotechnologies that "touch the beginnings of hu-
man life."189
 Suggesting the need to overhaul existing regulatory insti-
tutions and create new regulatory authorities, the President's Council
admitted that it was far from able to offer clear recommendations re-
garding major institutional reforms.' 9°
In 2003, the President's Council examined assisted human re-
production and explored whether legislation could be tailored to in-
clude new technology such as chimeras.m The only federal law cur-
183 Knowles, supra note 175.
184 See Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46 (2001), available at http://www.ac-
cess.gpo.gov/nara/cfr/waisidx_99/45cfr46_99.hunl . The Common Rule, a collection of
protocols originated in the 1970s, provides a regulatory framework for all federally funded
research on human subjects. Michael J. Malinowski, Choosing the Genetic Makeup of Children:
OurEugenics Past-Present, and Future, 36 CONN. REV. 125, 165-68 (2003).
186 Knowles, supra note 175.
133 See Assisted Human Reproduction Act §§ 21-14.
137 Knowles, supra note 175.
108 See REPRODUCTION AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 62, at 132. In Canada, policy-
makers originally conceived the AHR Act in the context of assisted reproductive technol-
ogy. See supra notes 220-224 and accompanying text.
139 See REPRODUCTION AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 62, at xxxix—xl.
' 9° See id. at 207; President's Council on Bioethics, Session 5: Biotechnology & Public Pol-
icy: Proposed Interim Recommendations, I (Sept. 5, 2003), http://www.bioethics.gov/
transcripts/sep03/session5.html (Chairman Leon Kass remarking during introduction to
session).
191 Sec Staff Working Paper, President's Council on Bioethics, U.S. Policy and the Elio-
technologies that Touch the Beginnings of Human Life: Draft Recommendations (Sept. 5,
2003), hup://www.hioethics.gov/background/bpprecommend.html
 [hereinafter Sept.
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rently in place to regulate assisted human reproduction is the Fertility
Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992, which does not en-
compass chimeras directly. 192 The President's Council recognized' the
need to "flesh out what these [terms] mean ... and [the] disagree-
ment about chimera:193 The President's Council's commitment to
formulating clear definitions of chimeras reflects the debate over the
definitions contained in Canada's AI-1R Act, which is discussed further
in Part IV. 194
In its deliberations, the President's Council discussed the need to
respect the humanity of procreation by preserving a reasonable
boundary between humans and non humans during the early stages of
life. 195 Because no public institutions are responsible for setting appro-
priate limits for these rapidly advancing technologies, the President's
Council urged Congress to adopt targeted restrictions on several well-
defined activities. 196 The Council recommended collecting these meas-
ures in a "Reproduction and Responsibility Act," which would acknowl-
edge the need for a moratorium on certain practices until the public
2003 Recommendations] (recommending a clear boundary between humans and animals
in procreation).
192 Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. §§ 263a-1 to -7
(2000); see Lars Noah, Assisted Reproductive nchnologies and the Pitfalls of Unregulated Biomedi-
cal Innovation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 603. 614-15 (2003) (describing role of Centers for Disease
Control under the Fertility Act in monitoring assisted reproductive technology, which did
not involve reporting adverse events). The President's Council recommended that Con-
gress modify the Fertility Act to include reporting requirements for 'Innovative Tech-
niques" including novel and experimental procedures. Sept. 2003 Recommendations,
supra note 191. The President's Council suggested that assisted reproductive technology
facilities should report the *extent to which technologies are tested in animals." Id. This
contemplated language, however, did not address human-nonhuman chimeras specifically.
See id.
193 Transcript, President's Council on Bioethics, Session 6: Biotechnology & Public Pol-
icy: Proposed Interim Recommendations, II (Sept. 5. 2003), http://www.bioethics.gov/
transcripts/sep03/session6.html.
194 See infra notes 208-249, 339-381, and accompanying text.
199 See Staff Working Paper, President's Council on Bioethics, Biotechnology and Public
Policy: Biotechnologies Touching the Beginnings of Life: Draft Recommendations (revised)
(Jan. 15, 2004), http://www.bioethics.gov/backgrotand/bppinterim.html [hereinafter Jan.
2004 Recommendations]; Staff Working Paper, President's Council on Bioethics, Biotech-
nology and Public Policy: Biotechnologies Touching the Beginnings of Life: Defending the
Dignity of Human Procreation (Oct. 16, 2003). http://mmbioethics.gov/background/
bpp_defend_dig.html [hereinafter Oct. 2003 Recommendations]: Transcript, President's
Council on Bioethics, Session 2: Toward a 'Richer Bioethics": Chimeras and the Boundaries
of the Human (Oct. 16. 2003), http://www.bioethics.gov/transcripts/oct03/session2.html
[hereinafter Oct. 2003 Session].
196 See REPRoDUC'llON AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 62, at 219.
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and legislators have had an opportunity to debate the appropriate gov-
ernance of these technologies. 07
2. The President's Council's Recommendations
In 2004, following its review and analysis, the President's Council
concluded that the creation of human-nonhuman chimeras raises
unique challenges to the character of human procreation. 198 The Presi-
dent's Council distinguished various contexts in which scientists create
chimeras, opining that there is nothing inherently objectionable about
mixing human and animal tissues. 199 hi the context of therapy and pre-•
ventative medicine, the President's Council endorsed xenotransplanta-
tion, animal-derived pharmaceuticals, and the insertion of animal genes
into humans or human fetuses to prevent disease. 20°
In the context of procreation, the President's Council recom-
mended two prohibitive rules to establish boundaries where it deemed
the ethical concerns most acute and the need for bright-line rules most
reasonable. 2° 1
 First, it recommended that Congress "[p] rohibit the
production of a hybrid human-animal embryo by fertilization of hu-
man egg by animal sperm or of animal egg by human sperm. 2" 02 The
President's Council explained that it did not want to judge the human-
ity or moral worth of a hybrid entity, and it did not want this ambigu-
ously human life to have nonhuman ancestors. 203
 Second, the Presi-
dent's Council recommended that Congress "[p]roscribe the transfer,
for any purpose, of any human embryo into the body of any member of
a non-human species," explaining that humans should be placed only
in human wombs.2°4
The President's Council initially discussed three provisions; 2°5
however, it omitted a recommendation prohibiting the combination of
human and nonhuman embryos. 208
 Some members suggested that this
prohibition was premature because the President's Council had not
197 Id.
08 Id.
I" See id. at 222.
200 Id. (expressing reservations about the inheritable genetic modification of eggs and
sperm).
201 REPRODUCTION AND RESPONSinn.rre, supra note 62, at 222.
202 /d. at 223.
2°3 Id. at 222.
2°4 Id. at 222-23.
206 CompareJan. 2004 Recommendations, supra note 195, with Oct. 2003 Recommenda-
tions, supra note 195.
206 Oct. 2003 Recommendations, supra note 195.
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considered sufficiently the potential scientific benefits of embryonic
chinieras. 207
W. CANADA'S AHR ACT AS A LEGISLATIVE MODEL FOR
CHIMERA REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES
In 2002, the President's Council examined Canada's efforts to
regulate reproductive technologies. 208 Canada's AHR Act reflects a
decade-long effort to address the moral and ethical issues surrounding
assisted reproductive technology, while promoting scientific and medi-
cal research.209 To satisfy the dual goals of resolving ethical concerns
and developing useful science, the AHR Act covers activities that are
completely prohibited 210 and those that are subject to regulatory con-
tro1.2 " The creation of various forms of chimeras and hybrids is prohib-
ited under the AHR Act. 2 t 2
A. Canada's Collectivist Approach Contrasted with the United States'
Individualist, Rights Based Approach to Biotechnology
The comimmitarian Canadian approach to assisted reproductive
technology is unlike the rights-based approach to biotechnology in the
United States. 2 " Differences between the two ideological frameworks
originate from the United States' heritage of rugged individualism and
regulatory suspicion, in contrast with Canada's historical and geo-
graphic reliance on ordered control and governmental guidance. 2"
These historical differences influence the Canadian and United
States' approaches to the regulation of novel biotechnology. 2 " For
207 See Transcript, President's Council on Bioethics, Sessions 3 Sc 4: Biotechnology and
Public Policy: Proposed Interim Recommendations, III and IV (Oct. 16, 2003), imp://
wwwhioethics.gov/transcript,s/oct03/session3_4.html.
2" See Knowles, supra note 175.
2c° Sec Angela Campbell, Defining a Policy Rationale for the Criminal Regulation of Reproductive
Techniques, 11 HEALTH L. REY. 26, 26-30 (2002); see also MONIQUE HiRER• Al.., PARLIA-
MENTARY RESEARCH BRANCH, LIBRARY OF PA/MIAMI:WC BILL G-6: ASSISTED HUMAN REPRO-
DUCTION Acr 20 (2004), available at littp://ww.parl.gc.ca/37/3/parlhus/chambus/house/
b ills/sit nunaries/c6-e.pdL
210 Assisted Human Reproduction Act, ch. 2, §§ 5-9, 2004 S.C. (Can.).
2111 Id. §§ 10-19.
212 See id. § 5(1)(i)—(j).
213 See Alison Harvison Young, New Reproductive Technologies in Canada and the United
States: Same Problems, Different Discourses, 12 TEme. 1N T' I. & Contr. L.R. 43, 53 (1998).
2" See id. at 50.
Oil See id. at 53. The Canadian government set forth its policy of setting boundaries for
the use of assisted reproductive technologies in a 1993 report. Id. The report recom-
mended legislation with criminal sanctions for the pursuit of certain new reproductive
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example, Canada has developed a stronger concept of public interest
than the United States. 216
 As a result, Canadian society is more accept-
ing than the United States of a broad and active role for the govern-
ment in promoting its public interest. 217 Consequently, the assump-
tion that the government should change social conditions for the
better has characterized policies regulating reproductive technology
in Canada.218
 The United States, in contrast, has been less receptive to
governmental interference in science and the marketplace, which has
led to an absence of biotechnology regulation. 219
B. Legislative Histoiy in Defining Chimeras in Canada's AHR Act
The legislative history of the AHR Act explains its emphasis on the
regulation of chimeras created from human embryological materials
and its exclusion of other types of chimeras. 22° Bill G6 originated from
guidelines issued in March 2002 by the Canadian Institutes of Health
Research (the "CIHR"), Canada's main federal funding agency for
health research. 221 The CIHR guidelines addressed cloning and human
embryo experimentation as well as the creation of embryological chi-
meras.222
Subsequent to the passage of the MR guidelines, the Canadian
Parliament released the AHR Act to regulate various forms of fertility
technologies, including human-nonhuman hybrids, and recommended the formation of a
regulatory and licensing body. Id.
216 See id.
217 See Id.
218 See Young, supra note 213, at 44.
219 See id. at 82. The United States retains traditional tort and contract remedies. See RP.-
PRODUCHON AND RI:SPONSE:MUM SUPD7 note 62, at 118-19; Young, supra note 213, at 82.
These legal regimes, however, have not been applied to human-nonhuman chimeras. See
REPRODUCTION AND RESPONSIBILI1Y, SUM nOte 62, at 1 18-19; Young, supra note 213, at 82.
220 SecJason Scott Robert, Regulating the Ctration of Novel Beings, 11 HEAurii L. REv. 14, 14
(2002) (explaining the AHR Act's primary emphasis on assisted reproductive technology and
secondary emphasis on human embryo research); see also Francoise Baylis, Betwixt and Between
Human Stem Cell Guidelines and Legislation, 11 HEAL-in L. REV. 44, 44 (2002) (describing AHR
Act's origin as legislation to regulate various aspects of infertility treatment).
221 Canadian Institutes of Health Research, Human Pluripotent Stem Cell Research:
Guidelines for CIHR-Funded Research § 7,4, littp://www.cihr-irsc.gc.ca/e/publications/
1487.shunl (updated Apr. 9, 2004) [hereinafter CIHR Guidelines] (serving as a precursor
to the AHR Act).
222 Id. Specifically, the guidelines prohibited CIHR funding for the following four ac-
tivities: (1) creating embryos for research purposes, (2) using nuclear transfer to develop
stem cells. (3) mixing human or nonhuman cells with a human embryo or fetus to create a
chimera, and (4) mixing human stein cells with a nonhuman embryo or fetus to create a
chimera. Id.; Baylis, supra note 220, at 44.
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treatment. 223 Although the AHR Act was designed to regulate in vitro
manipulation of human embryos, it also encompassed some of the em-
bryo and stem cell research guidelines propounded by the CIHR. 224
Notably, the AHR Act established a licensing system for embryo ex-
perimentation, 225 an area of research that continues to be heavily de-
bated in the United States. 22° Under the AHR Act, the CIHR will grant
licenses to researchers allowing them to utilize in vitro embryos, if the
CIHR is convinced that the research could not be completed using
stein cells or cells from other sources.227 These controversial licensing
and research provisions require that Canada form an oversight commit-
tee to provide a national ethics review of all stem cell research. 228
According to the legislation's objective to regulate assisted hu-
man reproduction,229 the AMR Act addresses only embryonic combi-
nations of both chimeras23° and hybrids. 231 Section 5(1) (i) of the AHR
22s
	
C-56, An Act Respecting Assisted Human Reproduction, 37th Parl., 1st Sess.
(2002) (Can.) (1st reading May 9, 2002), lutp://www.parl.gc.ca/37/1/parlbus/cham
bus/hou.se/bills/govermnent/C-56/C-56_1/C-56TOCE.hunl (last visited Apt. 8, 2004); Bay-
lis, supra note 220, at 44. The Canadian Health Minister first introduced time AHR Act as Bill
C-56 in the House of Commons in May 2002. Baylis, supra note 220, at 44. When Bill C-56 was
an Order Paper and tinder consideration for Royal Assent, Parliament was prorogued so that
all pending bills were automatically removed. Baylis, supra note 220, at 44. See generalbilloust:
OF COMMONS (CAN.), PRF.CIS OF PROCEDURE ch. 17 (last revised Nov. 2003), hitp://www.parl.
gc.ca/information/about/process/house/precis/chap17-ehtm  (setting forth the process for
prorogation, which ends a parliamentary session, and the subsequent reintroduction of
bills). In October 2002, the House of Commons withdrew Bill C-56 and reintroduced it as Bill
C-13. Baylis, supra note 220, at 44. Finally, the AHR Act was introduced in February 2004 into
the Canadian Senate as Bill C-6. Sec generally Assisted Human Reproduction Act, ch. 2. 2004
S.C. (Can.).
224	 .gay.. sIL supra note 220, at 44.
225 See Assisted Human Reproduction Act § 40(2).
228 See PARENS & KNOWLES, supra Mlle 7, at 9 (discussing societal disagreement about
the use of embryos in research).
227 See Assisted Human Reproduction Act § 40(2); IltaERT rr AL., supra note 209, at 18.
228 See Assisted Human Reproduction Act §§ 21-22.
229 Set HEAL'Ill CANADA, PROPOSALS FOR LEGISLATION GOVERNING ASSISIT.D HUMAN RE-
PRODUCTION: AN OVERVIEW 4 (2001) (describing guiding legislative principles), available at
http://wwwhc-sc.gc.ca/english/pdf/reproduction/repro_over.pdf.
230 In accord with the narrow scientific meaning. the AHR Act defines a chimera as
"(a) all embryo into which a cell of any non-human life form has been introduced; or (b)
an embryo that consists of cells of more than one embryo, foetus or human being." As-
sisted Human Reproduction Act § 3. This definition of chimera covers both human-
nonhuman chimeras and human-human chimeras. Id.
291 The AHR Act defines a hybrid as:
(a) a human ovum that has been fertilized by a sperm of a non-human life ,
form; (b) an ovum of a non-human life form that has been fertilized by a
human sperm; (c) a human ovum into which the nucleus of a cell of a non-
htumn life form has been introduced (d) an ovum of a non-human life form
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Act prohibits creating chimeras or transplanting chimeras into either
human beings or nonhuman life forms. 232 Section 5(1) (j) prohibits
creating hybrids for the purpose of reproduction or transplanting a
hybrid into either a human being or a nonhuman life form. 233 Sec-
tions 5(2) and 5(3) prohibit anyone from offering or advertising the
performance of any of the prohibited activities, or paying, or offering
to pay, someone else to do so. 234
C. Criticism of the AHR Act: Definitional and Criminal Issues
The AHR Act generated considerable controversy in Canada, be
cause the government provided few formal documents or statements
to justify the statutory ban. 236 Furthermore, the AHR Act generated
confusion over the scope and purpose of the definitions of chimera
and hybrid. 236
 The AHR Act takes a broad position in regard to hu-
man-nonhuman hybrids, prohibiting both traditional hybrid combi-
nations of eggs and sperm as well as transgenic organisms created us-
ing nuclear transfer techniques. 237 Additionally, the definition of
hybrid contains a catch-all provision to encompass variations of hy-
brids not presently con templated. 238 The prohibition, however, ap-
plies only to hybrids created for reproductive purposes. 239 Presumably,
scientists may create hybrids for research or any other purposes. 249
In contrast, the AHR Act adopts a narrow position on the prohi-
bition of human-nonhuman chimeras, describing only two possibili-
ties: (1) the insertion of nonhuman cells into human embryos, and
into which the nucleus of a human cell has been introduced; or (e) a human
ovum or an ovum of a non-human life form that otherwise contains haploid
sets of chromosomes from both a human being and a non-human life form.
Id.
232 1d.§ 5( 1)(i).
233 See id. § 5 (1) ( j).
234 Id. § 5(2)—(3).
233 See Caulfield, supra note 14, at 3-4.
236 See Baylis. sup/2 note 220, at 45 (describing definitional exclusion of Imman4o-
nonhuman and animal-to-animal chimeras); see also Matthew Herder, Donate a Definition, 11
HEA1:111 L. REV. 40, 40-41 (2003) (describing other definitional deficiencies in the AHR Act).
237. Assisted Human Reproduction Act §§ 3, 5(1) (j); see Robert, supra note 220, at 16.
The AHR Act prohibits the creation of hybrids in at least four ways: (I) human ovum/
nonhuman sperm, (2) non-human ovum/human sperm, (3) somatic cell nuclear transfer
("SCNT") with a human enucleated egg/nonhuman nucleus, and (4) SCNT with a non-
human enucleated egg/human nucleus. Assisted Human Reproduction Act §§ 3, 5(1)(j).
238 Assisted Human Reproduction Act §§ 3, 5(1) (j); see Robert. supra note 220, at 15.
23° See Assisted Human Reproduction Act §§ 3, 5(1) (j); Robert, supra note 220, at 14.
240 Sec Robert, supra note 220, at 14.
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(2) the insertion of cells from another human (at any stage of devel-
opment including other embryos) 241 into human embryos. 242 Notably,
the AHR Act does not encompass the transfer of human stem cells
into nonhuman embryos in its definition of chimera. 243 In addition,
the AHR Act does not address the movement of tissues or organs be-
tween humans and an imals. 244 Although the Canadian government
did not offer detailed explanations for its chosen definitions, the nar-
row definition of chimera likely resulted from the limited objective of
the legislation: to regulate human reproductive technology. 245
Critics of the AHR Act find its criminal sanctions, which carry
maximum penalties of $500,000 or tell years in prison, to be unduly
harsh.246 The original CIFIR guidelines never inflicted financial penal-
ties on researchers for noncompliance, but instead simply withheld
research funding. 247 Moreover, critics claim that researchers should
not face large fines and jail terms in their efforts to further scientific
knowledge.248 Conversely, supporters of the AHR Act argue that sanc-
tions would encourage researchers to act ethically and carefully when
engaging in stem cell research and related experiments. 249
V. IMPLICATIONS OF LEGISLATION TO REGULATE CHIMERAS IN THE
UNITED STATES USING THE AHR ACT AS A MODEL
A legislative prohibition on biotechnology similar to Canada's
AHR Act might raise constitutional issues in the United States. 250 For
241 The definition of chimera attempts to prevent all human-human embryonic chime-
ras. See Assisted Human Reproduction Act § 3. According to the statute, researchers may
not create chimeras by adding an embryo, fetus, or human being. See id. Technically, how-
ever, a researcher can still create a chimera using two pronuclei, which are pre-embryonic
combinations of egg and sperm before they fuse into a mononuclear zygote. HILARY
WHITE, CAMPAIGN LIFE COALITION, A FINAL. CRITICZUE or G S, at 20 (2003), available at
hup://www.lifesite.net/features/steincellembryo/c13finalcritique.pdf. For a discussion of
embryological development, see BRucE M. CARLSON. HUMAN Em urn-mm:1cm, & DEVEL-
OPMENTAL Blimouv 32 (1999).
242 Assisted HUMall Reproduction Act § 3; see Robert, supra note 220, at 16.
243 See Assisted Human Reproduction Act § 3. The CIHR guidelines, however, origi-
nally included this provision. See CIHR Guidelines, supra note 221, § 7.4.6; Robert, supra
note 220. at 16; supra note 222 and accompanying text.
244 Sec Assisted Human Reproduction Act § 3.
245 See supra note 220, and accompanying text.
246 See Assisted Human Reproduction Act §§ 60-64; Baylis, supra note 220, at 45.
247 CIHR Guidelines, supra note 221, § 7.4; Baylis, supra note 220, at 45.
245 Baylis, supra note 220, at 45-46.
242 Id,
250 For a comprehensive analysis of constitutional issues raised by biotechnology, which
are beyond the scope of this Note, see generally Lori B. Andrews. Is There a Right to Clone?
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example, prohibiting the creation of certain human-nonhuman chime-
ras might implicate the First Amendment and the Thirteenth Amend-
ment. 2" Nevertheless, given the rapid progression of biotechnology,
legislation would permit public deliberation about the role of scientific
research, the concept of personhood, the moral status of the embryo,
and the future of human-nonhuman chimeras. 252
A. Chimeras as Scientific and Artistic Expression Under the
U.S. Constitution
Opponents to the regulation of chimeras may assert that there is a
First Amendment free speech right and a Fourteenth Amendment
right to engage in scientific inquiry. 253 In 1923, the U.S. Supreme Court
stated in dicta in Meyers v. Nebraska that the Fourteenth Amendment
grants the right "to acquire useful knowledge."254 Nevertheless, courts
subsequently have not found a deeply rooted constitutional interest in
scientific inqui•y. 255
Scientific research, however, is a foundation for the exchange of
ideas, and might be entitled to the same constitutional protection as
the distribution of scientific information. 256 Although disseminating
scientific information is inherently communicative, scientists would
need to show that scientific research is likewise expressive as symbolic
conduct.257 The First Amendment protects expressive conduct if the
Constitutional Challenges to Bans on Human Cloning, 11 NARY. J.L. & 'Emit 643 (1998); John
A. Robertson, Liberty, Identity, and Human Cloning, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1371 (1998); Cass R.
Sunstein, Is There a Constitutional Right to Clone?, 53 HAS'TINGS Li. 987 (2002). But see gener-
ally Clarke D. Forsythe, Legal Perspectives on Cloning: Human Cloning and the Constitution, 32
VAL. U.L. REV. 469 (1998).
251 See infra notes 253-265, 289-291, and accompanying text.
252 See REPRODUCTION AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 62, at 271-72 (discussing the
benefits of targeted legislative prohibitions).
255 Adams, supra note 117, at 108.
" 4 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Adams, supra note 117, at 111.
255 See Adams, supra note 117, at 110; Andrews, supra note 250, at 661-64. Instead,
some courts have set limits on scientific inquiry. See, e.g., Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Stipp. 1302,
1322 (N.D. Ill. 1978), affd sub nom. Wynn v. Carey, 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979) (finding no
scientific right to experiment on fetuses). Furthermore, the government may regulate
research methods to protect the rights of research subjects and conununity safety. See An-
drews, supra note 250, at 663-64.
256 Adams, supra note 117, at 108.
257 See id. at 108-09.
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conduct is intended to convey a particularized message, and if it is
likely that those who view the message will understand it. 258
Chimera creation, in particular, may straddle the line between
scientific inquiry and artistic expression. 259 For example, images of
mice with artificial human ears growing on their backs have been de-
scribed as "the most symbolically-charged recent depictions of bio-
medical experimentation and its challenge to the category 'hit-
man."26° In addition, artists have recognized the potential for creative
expression through transgenics. 28 t For example, one artist produced a
green-fluorescent-protein rabbit with DNA derived from a jellyfish. 262
The artist has announced his plans to produce a glowing clog by the
same technique and, likewise, to create human-nonhuman chimeras
as potential art. 265 The artist explained that his work is defined not
only by the scientific creations themselves, but also by their roles in
society.264 Given the expressive aspects of creating chimeras, courts
may be forced to make decisions about emerging biotechnology on
the basis of the First Amendmen t.265
258 Sec Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 414-15 (1974) (displaying American flag
superimposed on peace symbol was form of expression); Adams, supra note 117, at 109
(noting that biological research might not meet this standard of expression).
2" See, e.g., Eduardo Kac, Transgenic Art, 6 LEONARDO ELEC. ALMANAC (Dec. 18, 1998), at
littp://mitpress2.mit.edu/e-jotirnals/LEA/ARTICLES/TRANSART/transart.littnl . See geneiL
ally THE EIGHTH DAY: THE TitANSGENIC or EDUARDO KAC (Dan Collins & Sheilah Brit-
ton eds., 2003).
260 Sarah Franklin, Drawing the Line at Not-Fully-Human: What 11ic Already Know, 3 Am. J.
Iliomitics, Summer 2003, at W25, W25, at http://mitpress ,mit.edu/journals/ajob/3/3/
W25.pdf. The "ear" was an artificial scaffold that was nourished by the mouse's skin cells.
Joseph D'Agnese, Mothers with Heart, 22 DISCOVER, July 2001, at 40.
261 Jeremy Rifkin, Dazzled by the Science: Biologists Who Dress up Hi-Tech Eugenics as a New Art
Form Are Dangerously Deluded, "11HE GUARDIAN, Jan. 14, 2003, at 17. http://www.guard-
ian.comk/comment/story/0,3604,874312,00.html (critical analysis of transgenic art and
artistic aspects of modern biotechnology innovations). But see EUGENE Tit/WISER, AES*1111:TIC:
BIOLOGY, BIOLOGICAL. ART, at littp://art-desi,gn.smsttedu/acm/contextin/fall_03/thacker/
thacker_print.hunl (responding to Rifkin's comments regarding trausgenic art) (last visited
Apr. 7, 2004).
282 See EDUARDO KAC: TELEPRESENCE, BIOTELEMATICS, AND TRANSGEN IC ART 101-31
(Peter T. Dobrila & Aleksandra Bostic eds., 2000), reprinted in Eduardo Kac. GFP
Bunny, 36 LEONARDO 97, 97 (2003), available at http://mvw.ekac.org/gfpbunny.hunl#
gfpbunnyanchor.
063 See Bac, supra note 259.
264 See Kac, supra note 262, at 98-100. The group, Critical Art Ensemble, presents per-
formance art called GenTerra in which the audience participates in a decision involving
the release of benign transgenic bacteria. See generally GENTERRA, at http://www.critical-
art.net/biotech/genterra/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2004).
255 See Adams, supra note 117, at 109-10. The claim of artistic expression through chi-
meras relates to the First Amendment claim to religious expression through biotechnol-
ogy. See id, at 107; sec also U.S. CoNsT. amend. 1. Cults such as the Radians have developed
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B. A nimal Rights Debate
Despite arguments that species are constantly changing and that
human beings have been crossing species lines for years in agriculture
and selective breeding, critics assert that scientists should not create
chimeras because biotechnology should not disrupt individual spe-
cies.266
 Regardless of whether the concept of species is simply a biologi-
cal construct, 267
 animals often stiffer for the advancement of science. 268
Researchers will continue 10 employ genetic engineering and other
biotechnology techniques on animals to study human disease, to de-
velop pharmaceuticals, and to improve food and organ sources. 269
Notwithstanding these beneficial opportunities, some animal rights or-
ganizations continue to oppose biotechnology developments, inchiding
the patenting of life fort ns. 270
The exploitation of human-nonhuman chimeras raises unique
concerns, because unlike other animal research subjects, these chimeras
are partially human.271 Human beings are no longer defined solely by
genetic composition. 272 The Human Genome Project, which sequenced
the DNA of a small number of individuals, revealed the genetic similar-
ity of human beings to one another and to other species. 2" Conse-
quently, the ethical debate regarding how to regulate chimera requires
characterizing person hood. 27 ''
technology around this claim. See Adams, supra note 117, at 109; see also THE RAEI.IAN MES-
SAGE, at http://vAvw.rael.org/english/index,html (last visited Apr. 1, 2004).
266 See Magnani, supra note 71, at 457-58.
267 Id. at 458; see also Robert & Baylis, supra note 3, at 3-4, 5 n.8 (discussing lack of sci-
entific consensus on how to define species),
268 See Morin, supra note 30. at 176.
269 See U. at 177-80.
270 Sec id. at 176.
271 See Cynthia B. Cohen, Creating Human-Nonhuman Chimeras: Of Mite and Men, 3 An. j.
Iltormics, Summer 2003, at W3, W3-5, at http://mitpress.mitedu/journals/ajob/
3/3/w3.pdf. But see Nlagnani, supra note 71, at 456 (indicating the overall value of research
involving chimeras in comparison to research involving other animal subjects); Morin, supra
note 30, at 177 (noting that trausgenic animals may become superior research models, which
would lessen suffering by reducing the number of organisms needed in experiments).
272 See Robert & Baylis, supra note 3, at 4. Despite a variety of biological attributes that
might be uniquely human, scientific evidence alone cannot define species adequately. See
hi. at 4-5. Some commentators have suggested that the "notion of human uniqueness is a
myth or a convenient and comforting fabrication by human beings." Kimberly A. Urie et
al., The Humane Imperative: A Moral Opportunity, 3 AM. J. BIOETII ICS, Summer 2003, at W20,
W20, athttp://tnitpress.mit.edu/journals/ajob/3/3/w20.pdf.
273 See Robert & Baylis, supra note 3, at 4.
274 Linda MacDonald Glenn, Biotechnology at the Margins of Personhood: An Evolving Legal
Paradigm, 13 J. EvoLtmou & 'lien. 1, 42 (2002), at http://wwwjetpress.org/volume13/
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C. The Moral Status of the Human Embryo
Legal and regulatory issues in modern biotechnology often de-
pend on determining the "moral status"278 of the embryo. 278 The em-
bryo in utero is not a "person" under the Fourteenth Amendment
according to the 1973 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wad4
however, that decision may not bear on the status of a living human
embryo ex utero, where there is ilo imperative to consider fetal and
maternal rights together. 277 Courts have held that living human em-
bryos occupy an interim position between person and properly that
entitles them to "special respect" because of their potential to become
human life.278
In regard to human cloning, President George W. Bush has de-
clared his support for legislative proposals to ban all human clon-
ing. 278 Congress, however, has not been able to reach a consensus. 288
The debate involves the process of nuclear transfer, which may be
glcnu.pdf (proposing a person-property continuum to evaluate personhood and to arrive
at common legal understanding to apply to new intelligent life).
275 Moral status is "PI he standing of a being or entity in relation to other moral agents
or individuals. To have moral status is to be an entity toward which human beings, as moral
agents, have or can have moral obligations." HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY, Supra
note 26, at 233.
276 See Adams, supra note 117, at 147-48; Casey & Adams, supm note 78, at 112 (discuss-
ing special respect doctrine for human embryos); Zither, supra note 114, at Al ("We as a
society are ambivalent about the moral status of the embryo. That's why this {debate] has
been going on for a long time, and why no one waists to try to sort it out." (quoting Profes-
sor Arthur L. Caplan of University of Pennsylvania)).
277 See 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973); Casey & Adams, supra note 78, at 118-19. But see Doe
v. Shalala, 862 F. Stipp. 1421, 1426, 1429 (D. Md. 1994) (denying embryo standing to rep-
resent class of embryos suing to enjoin federally funded research because an embryo is not
a "person").
278 Sec Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn, 1992) (concluding that embryos "are
not, strictly speaking, either 'persons' or 'property,' but occupy an interim category that
entitles them to special respect because of their potential for human life"); cf. Kass v. Kass,
696 N.E.2d 174, 181 (N.Y. 1998) (holding that embryos are not persons for constitutional
purposes, but declining to address whether embryos are entitled to special respect); Oct.
2003 Recommendations, supra note 195 (referring to the "special respect owed nascent
human life—and even, if to a somewhat lesser degree, to egg and sperm, in view of their
standing as the potential seeds of a new child and of a new human generation").
279 See juorm A. JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY Or CONG„ HUMAN CLON-
ING 11 (2003), available at http://www.usembassy.it/pdf/other/RL31358.pdf; Bush, supra
note 10, at 1150 (declaring strong opposition to cloning).
280 See junrrn A. JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY Or CONG„ STEM CELL RE
SEARCH 15-17 (2003), available at http://www.usembassy.it/pdf/other/RL31015.pdf (de-
scribing proposed human cloning and stem cell legislation); Bryn E. Floyd. Comment,
Regulation of Stem Cell Research: A Recommendation That the United States Adopt the Australian
Approach, 13 PAC. Rim L. & Pot.'v J. 31, 32-33 n.12 (2004).
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used to create cloned human embryos as well as human-nonhuman
embryos.28' Opponents of a complete ban on human cloning gener-
ally approve of using nuclear transfer to create embryos, provided the
embryos are not used for reproductive purposes. 282 Those in favor of
a ban on human cloning generally believe that a partial ban, prohibit-
ing only cloning to produce children, would be impossible to enforce;
therefore, pragmatic and ethical concerns require a complete ban on
human cloning. 283
Embryos, unlike chimeras, are entirely human, yet the United
States has not prohibited their manufacture or destruction in human
cloning and embryo research. 284
 Therefore, until legislators reach a
consensus on the moral status of the living human embryo, which
contains the potential to become a human being and from which all
human beings develop, any attempt to define and regulate human-
non human chimeras will remain complicated.285
D. The Moral Status of Chimeras: Beyond Regulation
In the absence of legislation or as a result of renegade science,
human-nonhuman chimeras may be inevitable. 288 In response, the
courts and legislatures will need to decide the status of transgenic
creatures and determine how to classify them on a scale between per-
son and property. 287 The classification of chimeras as human would
restrict their legal use in scientific research. 288 In fact, the prospec-
tive treatment of human-nonhuman chimeras may resemble the his-
tory of racial classification in the United States. 288 Indeed, if chime-
ras are human, then committing them to scientific experimentation
SeeJol INSON, supra note 279, at 4; see also supra note 60.
2E2 See Adams, SUM note 117, at 85-86 (describing biotechnology industry's view).
283 See id. at 106.
284 ScejoitNSON, SUP? note 280, at 18.
288 See Adams, supra note 117, at 118-49.
286 See Newman, supra note 16, at 160. 462-63 (suggesting that society is moving toward
"an era of lifelike artifacts" in which it will need to determine the legal status of humanoid
creations); see also Linda MacDonald Glenn, A Legal Perspective on Humanity. Personhood, and
Species Boundaries, 3 Am. J. Mount lcs, Summer 2003, at 27, 27 (indicating that further
scientific advances may result, intentionally or unintentionally, in chhneras with superior
intelligence to existing nonhuman animals).
287 Sec Glenn, supra note 286, at 28; see also Glenn, supra note 274, at 42.
288 Cirlin, supra note 16, at 507-08.
288 See David Wasserman, Species and Races, Chimeras, and Multiracial People, 3 An. J.
litormics, Summer 2003, at W13, W13-14, at
It t tp://tnitpress.mit.edu/journals/ajob/3/3/
w13.pdf.
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would be a form of servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment290 and also would violate their First Amendment. right of free-
dom of association . 291
The question remains whether chimeras would be treated as
animals even if they consist almost entirely of human DNA. 292 The
constitutional difficulties arise not only in patent law, but in terms of
what types of research would infringe on personhood.293 Due to the
imprecise definition of human being supplied by the courts, legisla-
tors, and agencies, the rights afforded to human-nonhuman chimeras
will depend on a determination of their humanity. 294 These questions
are admittedly esoteric, 299 but the law must consider now the legal
ramifications of the creation of new "species" of chimera. 296
VI. THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF ADOPTING LEGISLATION SIMILAR TO
CANADA'S AHR ACT TO REGULATE THE CREATION OF
CHIMERAS IN THE UNITED STATES
To prevent the unrestricted development of human-animal chi-
meras, the United States should pass legislation similar to Canada's
AHR Act. 297 Existing institutions are not equipped to regulate this
emerging biotechnology. 298 By enacting clearly defined legislation,
Congress may address the legal and ethical complexities presented by
human-nonhuman chimeras, while continuing to promote medical
and scientific advances. 299
A. Existing Regulatory Mechanisms Do Not Encompass Chimera Technology
The President's Council suggested that existing institutions can-
not regulate sufficiently the creation of various types of human-
299 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; Cirlin, supra note 16, at 507.
291 U.S. CONST. amend. 1; see Cirlin, supra note 16, at 507.
292 See Magnani, supra note 71. at 449-50.
295 See Cirlin, supra note 16, at 507.
2" See Rivard, supra note 28, at 1441-45; supra notes 275-285 and accompanying text.
295 See Sagoff, SUPra note 39, at 29. This discussion is abstract in the sense that the crea-
tion of a living, hybrid creature is unlikely at this time. Sec id. Sagoff asserts that, outside my-
thology, no proposed scientific project raises such moral ambiguities and challenges to moral
intuitions about what it means to be human or the species concept of Homo sapiens. Id.
296 See Chakrabrarty, supra note 6, at 21; sec also Glenn, supra note 286, at 28.
297 See Assisted Human Reproduction Act, ch. 2, §§ 3,5 (1) OH j), 2004 S.C. (Can.).
298 See supra notes 96-197 and accompanying text.
299 See REPRODUCHON AND R/SPONSIBILITY, supra note 62, at 222-23 (recommending
legislation to create a reasonably separate boundary between humans and DODiDIDLIDS in
assisted reproductive technologies).
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nonhuman chimeras?" Patent law, agency regulation by the FDA, and
other regulatory mechanisms are not equipped to deal adequately
with human-nonhuman chimera technology." 1
1. Patent Law Is an Insufficient Means of Regulating Biotechnology
In the area of patent law, Congress recently affirmed the USPTO's
authority to deny patents pertaining to human life; however, it remains
unclear whether the USPTO will deny patents on certain human-
nonhuman chimeras." 2 Patent law cannot completely regulate bio-
technology because scientists may decide to pursue certain technolo-
gies regardless of whether the products or processes are patentable. 03
Also, patent protection is limited to twenty years, after which technol-
ogy enters the public domain. 904 Furthermore, patent law should be
morally neutral, because it was designed to reward inventors of desir-
able inventions rather than to regulate or prohibit undesirable tech-
nology?'" Therefore, the USPTO may lack authority and resources to
limit patents on technology to develop human-nonhuman chimeras. 306
Nevertheless, there is an underlying concern about the corn-
modification of human life 3°7 in biotechnology patents in the United
States.308 Patent law could be used to declare some biotechnology to
be unpatentable subject matter because these technologies pose
significant risks to human dignity. 3°9 Some threats to human dignity
have benefits to technology, science, and medicine that outweigh any
306 See id. at 176-81.
3°' Sec id.
303 Sec supra 'lows 132-140 and accompanying text.
"'Nash, supra note 121, at 299.
3°4 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2) (2000); Nash, supra note 121, at 300.
3°5 Id.
306 See id. at 300.
3°7 Commodification "is the treatment of human beings or body tissues and substances as
commodities—as means to an end, not as ends in themselves. Thus cominercialization in-
cludes commodification, but commodification need not entail profit motive." Nut. SZABO,
TDE ETHICS AND SCIENCE or STEM CELLS 115 (2002), available at http://www.paulszabo .
com/images/pdf books/Microsoft%20Word%20420BKSteml.pdf.
305 See David B. Resnick, Patents on Human-Animal Chinteras and Threats to Human Dig-
nity, 3 Awl Ilnorm ics, Sununer 2003, at 35,35.
309 Id. Violations of human dignity are distinct from threats to human dignity. Id. Viola-
tions to human dignity occur when one treats a whole human being, or part of a human
being closely connected to the whole human being as a commodity with only a market
value, Id. In contrast, threats to human dignity occur when one engages in a practice that
could lead to violations to human dignity. Id. According to these definitions, patents on
human gametes and stem cells are threats to human dignity. Id.
20041	 Regulating Human-Nonhuman Chimeras 	 657
harms.") In these instances, such patents should be permitted if care-
ful attention is paid to the laws and policies that apply to the practices
involved, with a goal of minimizing threats to human dignity."'
Then again, a policy of allowing patents with the goal of minimiz-
ing threats to human dignity should not apply to close cases involving
human-nonhuman chimeras." 2 For example, it is difficult to distin-
guish a human embryo from a human embryo with a few animal
genes. 3 " In this case, by asserting a compelling interest in protecting
human dignity, the government may eliminate the need to decide
whether these chimeras are human because they are close enough to
raise concerns. 314 This analysis still poses the difficult question of decid-
ing when a chimera is "humanlike" enough to be unpatentable, but this
is less difficult than deciding whether a chimera is "human" at al1. 3 " In
comparison, the moral utility test in patent law is not particularly useful
in a patent application for human-nonhuman chimeras, because the
utilitarian arguments would inevitably outweigh the deontological ar-
guments in the patent forum." 8 Therefore, the debate over the patent-
ability of chimeras will continue in the USPTO until either Congress or
the U.S. Supreme Court intervenes to set clear boundaries on the pat-
entability of humanlike life forms. 3"
2. The FDA Lacks Jurisdiction to Regulate Chimeras
The USPTO's refusal to issue patents for chimeras that are less
than fifty percent human does not eliminate the ability of researchers
to pursue this controversial technology." 8 Therefore, legislators should
intervene with regulations to prohibit certain human-nonhuman chi-
meras in order to protect and promote the public interest. 319 Any effort
by the FDA to declare jurisdiction over chimeras would route this tech-
nology into a regulatory system without the benefit of a public debate
310 Id.
311 Id. When human-nonhuman chimeras are not clearly humanlike, then their crea-
tion is less threatening to human dignity, and the USPTO should grant patents for such
chimeras. Id. at 36.
312 See id.
313 Resnick, supra note 308, at 36.
sip
315 Id. at 35.
310 See Magnani, supra note 71, at 456.
312 Sec id.
318 See Nash, supra note 121, at 299.
819 See REPRoDUCTION AND RESPONSIRILITV, supra note 62, at 208-09.
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in Congress.320
 Furthermore, it is likely that those planning to produce
human-nonhuman chimeras would support FDA jurisdiction as a less
restrictive alternative to legislation, because FDA oversight might not
foreclose controversial chimera research regardless of public opposi-
tion.321
 Consequently, FDA jurisdiction would absolve Congress of its
role in resolving the unprecedented ethical issues raised by chimeras. 322
An additional limitation to FDA jurisdiction is the FFDC Act's
requirement that information about the process of product design
and the results of clinical trials must remain confidential during the
approval process.323 This process, which takes place in secrecy, does
not permit a public discussion about the safety and significance of the
relevant biotechnolog-y.3" Moreover, FDA jurisdiction inhibits the crea-
tive resolution of broad public questions involving ethics and human
values.325 Therefore, although the FDA has not stated explicitly
whether the creation of chimeras falls within its jurisdiction, the FDA
should not assert its regulatory authority over chimera technolop: 326
Notwithstanding these disadvantages, if chimera technology may
be classified as a drug, medical device, or biological product, then the
FDA legally could assert its regulatory authority over the research and
development of chimeras. 327 Already, the FDA has declared its jurisdic-
tion over xenotransplantation, primarily under its biologics authority. 328
In 2003, the FDA issued comprehensive guidelines for the transfer of
32° See Merrill & Rose. supra note 170. at 146 (suggesting that the FDA's assertion °Ott-
risdiction over human cloning preempted the public discussion of moral and ethical is-
sues); see also Merrill, supra note 155, at *82.
321 See Merrill, supra note 155, at *74 (suggesting that biotechnology industry might fa-
vor FDA regulation because of concern that a legislative ban would be either too broad or
too restrictive);•see also Rokosz, supra note 9, at 490 (indicating biotechnology industry's be-
lief that the FDA has authority over human cloning and that legislation is unnecessary).
'22 See Price. supra note 161, at 628.
323 See Merrill, supra note 155, at *6-8.
324 Sec id.
325 See Merrill & Rose, supra note 170, at 146, 198.
329 Sec PARENS KNowims, siipm note 7, at 12 (recommending against the FDA's ex-
clusive mandate over technologies such as human cloning and ooplasm transplantation).
327 See Price, supra note 161, at 621; see also 21 U.S.C. § 321 (g) (1), (h) (2000) (describ-
ing drugs and devices); 42 U.S.C. § 262(i) (2000) (describing biological products).
328 See CUL FOR 1410LOCICS EVALUATION & RE:SEARCH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: SOURCE ANIMAL, PRODUCT, PRECLINICAL, AND CLINICAL ISSUES
CONCERNING THE USE OF XENCEIVANSPLANTATION PRODUCTS IN HUMANS 7 (Apr. 2003),
available at http://1ww.fda.gov/cber/gdlns/clinxeno.pdf;  Letter from Jay P. Siegel, Direc-
tor, Office of Therapeutics Research and Review of the Center for Biologics Evaluation and
Research (Mar. 8, 2002) (advising practitioners of FDA jurisdiction over xenotransplanta-
lion), available at http://www.fda.gov/cber/ltr/humemb.pdf; see also 21 U.S.C.
§321(g)(1), (h).
2004]	 Regulating Human-Nonhuman Chimeras	 659
cells, tissues, and organs from nonhuman organisms, or from living
nonhuman biological materials, into humans. 329 Although the FDA
recognized the benefits of this technology for transplant recipients, it
expressed concern about the spread of infectious disease and the for-
mation of new viruses in the general human population."" The poten-
tial for disease transmission or genetic abnormalities could prompt. the
FDA to regulate human-nonhuman chimeras similarly to its regulation
of porcine heart valves or human heart valves used in transplanta-
tion."'
It is unlikely, however, that Congress intended for the FDA to
have jurisdiction over chimera creation, because this might exceed
the FDA's authority under its enabling statutes. 332 In light of FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Cot p., in which the U.S. Supreme Court, in
2000, rejected the FDA's interpretation of its enabling statute to en-
compass tobacco, other courts may take a similar stance on the FDA's
assertion of jurisdiction over human embryos and biotechnology. 333
Nevertheless, the FDA maintains that existing laws provide both
jurisdiction and sufficient means of control over certain biotechnolo-
gies.334 The courts, in accord, have not voided any FDA initiatives in
biotechnology. 335 Given the tendency of courts to yield to FDA control
in biotechnology, judicial decisions may not provide an accurate
measure of whether the FDA has exceeded its regulatory reach or
failed to extend its reach far enough. 338 More specifically, the judici-
ary may not evaluate whether the FDA moved too hesitantly toward
emerging technologies and whether the impact of the FDA's regula-
tions lagged behind developing technology. 337 Therefore, even if' the
FDA or another regulatory body had the authority to regulate chime-
ras, legislation would still be appropriate.338
325 See CUR. FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION & RESEARCH. supra note 328, at 1.
130 See id. at 2.
331 See supra notes 167-169 and accompanying text.
332 Sec Rokosz, supra note 9, at 512-13; sec also Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of
1938, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397; Public Health Service Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 201-300; Chevron.
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
333 Ste 529 U.S. 120. 126 (2000); Rokosz, supra note 9, at 513.
334 See Merrill, supra note 155, at
335 See id. at *3. But see Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 126 (voiding FDA jurisdiction
over tobacco).
336 Sec Merrill, supra note 155, at *3.
332 See id.
338 Sec REPRODUCTION AND RYSPONSIIIII.rrv, supra note 62, at 191.
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B. Canada's AHR Act as a Model for Legislation Regulating Chimeras
in the United States
Unlike regulation by federal agencies, patent law, and federal
funding, legislation directly regulating the creation of human-non-
human chimeras would apply to all research in the private and public
sectors.339 Research would be governed by one set of rules rather than
by separate standards for federal or private funding. 340 This would
eliminate any encouragement to move research to the private sector. 341
1. Definitional Concerns: Which Chimeras Should Be Regulated?
In adopting legislation similar to Canada's AHR Act, the United
States must resolve complex definitional issues that have led to criti-
cism of the AHR Act.342 Congress must determine which chimeras to
prohibit and then frame the terminology to include only the chimeras
being targeted.343 Legislation modeled after the AHR Act should
refine the Act's comprehensive definition of hybrid and develop a
more inclusive definition of chimera that incorporates all chimeras
made using human embryos.344 Interspecies organisms that do not fall
within the statutory language should be evaluated using several factors,
including, but not limited to (1) the types of biological materials com-
bined, (2) the relationship between the combined organisms, (3)
whether the combination occurs naturally or through human interven-
tion, and (4) at which point in development the combination occurs. 345
This evaluation could be accomplished by a new regulatory body.346
"9 See Baylis, supra note 220, at 45.
MD Id.
341 See id.
342 Sec supra notes 235-245 and accompanying text.
343 See supra notes 235-245 and accompanying text. The definition of chimera set forth
in the AHR Act is underinclusive. Sec Assisted Human Reproduction Act, ch. 2, §§ 3, 5,
2004 S.C. (Can.). This Note proposes that Congress adopt a more specific definition of
chimera as discussed infra notes 344-373 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
need for precise definitions in legislation to regulate biotechnology, see HUMAN CLONING
AND HUMAN DIGNEIY, supra note 26, at 37-55 (discussing the definition of human don-
Mg); Herder, supra note 236, at 40-42 (discussing the definition of embryo donor).
944
	 Robert, supra note 220, at 15-16.
343 See Greely, supra note 2, at 17 (proposing broad criteria to .evaluate chimeras).
348 See REPRODUCTION AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 62, at 188-89 (proposing a new
regulatory agency of the executive branch to oversee biotechnology).
20041	 Regulating Human-Nonhuman Chimeras 	 661
a. Animal-to-Animal Chimeras
Despite ethical concerns about designing new creatures solely for
human exploitation, animal-animal chimeras may be excluded from a
reasonable legislative definition of chimeras. 347 The President's Coun-
cil discussed the creation of animal-animal chimeras in detail, but
these chimeras pose no significant ethical issues because they contain
no human components and do not impinge on the concept of per-
sonhood.348 Consequently, any regulatory definition of chimera in-
cluding animal-animal chimeras would be accurate scientifically but
would be overinclusive if the foots of legislation is biotechnology in-
volving nascent human life. 349
b. Human-to-Human Chimeras
In contrast to animal-animal, the scientific community has
shunned the creation of human-human chimeras in the laboratory. 35°
For example, researchers criticized a 2003 experiment that combined
male and female human embryos into a single hermaphroditic hu-
man-human chimera. 351 These artificial chimeras raise moral con-
cerns because of their minimal utility, their unnaturalness, and their
adverse effect on human dignity. 352 Both the AHR Act and the Presi-
dent's Council's interim recommendations contain provisions ban-
ning the creation of some human-human embryos. 353
 Therefore,
347 Sec Robert, supra note 220, at 16; see also Oct. 2003 Session, supra note 195.
"a See Oct. 2003 Session, supra note 195; Greely, supra note 2, at 19.
349 See Robert, supra note 220. at 16.
350 See Tabitha M. Powledge, The Scientist, Mixed-Sex Embryo Controversy: Scientific Skepti-
cism and Ethical Criticism of Chimera Research Presented in Spain. at http://www.biomedcen tral.
coin/news/20030708/01 ( July 8, 2003). For example, University of Pennsylvania Professor
Arthur Caplan stated that the use of human embryos to create human-human chimeras for
research was the inevitable product of years of under-regulation of the reproductive tech-
nology industry. See id.
331 See id. At the 2003 meeting of the European Society of Human Reproduction and
Embryology (the "ESHRE"), Norbert Gleicher of the Center for Human Reproduction in
Chicago and New York reported that he had merged a cell from a male embryo with a
female embryo and had grown the hermaphrodite hybrid in a lab for six days before de-
stroying it. Norbert Gleicher &':X. Tang, Blastontar Transplantation as a Possible Treatment,
Abstracts of the 19th Annual Meeting of the ESHRE, Madrid, Spain ( July 1, 2003), avail-
able at http://humrep.oupjournals.org/cgi/reprint/18/suppll /XVIL157.pdf. The ESHRE
and other scientists immediately condemned Gleicher's research, claiming that it was both
scientifically and ethically objectionable. Powledge, supra note 350.
332 See Greely, supra note 2, at 17-19.
333 See Assisted Human Reproduction Act, ch. 2, §§ 3, 5(1) (i), 2004 S.C. (Can.); RE-
PRODUMON AND RESPONSIRILITV, supra note 62, at 222-23.
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chimera regulation should prohibit explicitly the creation of all hit-
. maii-human chimeras at the embryonic leve1. 354
c. Nonhuman-to-Human. Chimeras
The AHR Act also prohibits the transfer of nonhuman cells to
human embryos to form chimeras. 355
 These nonhuman-human combi-
nations raise strong ethical considerations because they utilize develop-
ing human embryos.356
 Although the President's Council decided not
to recommend a ban on the combination of human and nonhuman
embryos, Congress nevertheless should prohibit the creation of these
nonhuman-human chimeras.357
 This is because they violate human
dignity and the doctrine of special respect for human embryos and
they could lead to the development of new humanlike species for sci-
entific exploitation
The AHR Act does not address non-embryonic transfers from
nonhumans to humans; however, these transfers should be consid-
ered by a regulatory body that can balance the various factors. 359 Al-
though many of these transfers are widely accepted, some pose
unique ethical concerns. 360
 In the area of xenotransplantation, the
placing of pig heart. valves in human beings caused some initial con-
cern among recipients; however, this transplant procedure is now
regulated and accepted. 561
 The public is not likely to object to the de-
velopment of other single organ transplants from animals into human
beings.362
 Yet, if a human were to receive many organs from a non-
human, or if it were possible to transfer a single vital organ from a
354 See REpuonucTioN AND RESPONSDID.rrY, supra note 62, at 225 (recommending bats
on hu man-human chimeras but only for the purposes of reproduction). The AHR Act
prohibits the creation of a human clone by any technique, including nuclear transfers.
Assisted Human Reproduction Act § 5(1) (a). But see id. § 40(2) (allowing licensed use of in
vitro human embryos); supra notes 225-227 and accompanying text.
363 Assisted Human Reproduction Act, ch. 2, §§ 3, 5(1)(i), 2004 S.C. (Can.). The AHR
Act also prohibits the artificial transfer of nonhuman nuclei to human cells for reproduc-
tion. Id. §§ 3, 5(1)(j).
336 See Greely, supra note 2, at 19.
157 See REPRonuctioN AND REspoNstmrrry, supra note 62, at 222-23.
1" See Johnston & Eliot, supra note 29, at 6-7; supra notes 275-296.
359 See Assisted Human Reproduction Act § 3; supra notes 345-346 and accompanying
text.
366 See supra notes 76-81,275-296, and accompanying text.
361 Greely, supra note 2, at 19. Transferring nonhuman parts into human beings is
troubling to many people because of the practical fear of the passage of disease through
the transfer. See id. Animal rights proponents also object to such transfers as violations of
species integrity. See id.
362 Id.
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similar species (such as a primate brain) into a human, then concern
might arise as to whether the resulting organism was really human, 363
Thus, chimeras made by moving nonhuman parts into human beings
raise concerns when the transfer is significant enough to cast doubts
on the humanity of the recipient. 364 The AHR Act, by definition, does
not cover this mode of chimera creation; nevertheless, the United
States should consider creating a new regulatory body to evaluate
these transfers, 365
ci. Human-to-Nonhuman Chimeras
Neither the AHR Act. nor the recommendations of the Presi-
dent's Council prohibit the transfer of human stem cells to nonhu-
man embryos.'" Generally, medical and scientific uses of chimeras
are less objectionable than the creation of chimeras for art or curios-
ity;367 however, any transfer of human embryonic cells to developing
nonhumans presents the same ethical concerns as nonhuman-to-
human chimeras and should be restricted. 308
On a non-embryonic level, the public generally accepts scientific
and medical practices involving the transfer of human material to
animals, such as in the creation of transgenic mice. 309 A research pro-
posal to create a mouse with human neurons in its brain received
publicity, but did not generate much disapproval. 370 A research pro-
posal transferring human brain tissue into a primate, however, would
cause more serious ethical concerns because of the similarities be-
tween the two species. 371 Thus, chimeras made by moving human
parts into nonhuman beings raise concerns when the transfer is
significant enough to cast doubts on the humanity of the recipient. 372
This research should also be reviewed by a new regulatory body. 373
363 Id.
3154 Id. at 17, 19.
365 See Assisted limnan Reproduction Act, ch. 2, § 3, 2004 S.C. (Can.); REPRODUCTION
AND RESPONS I BM EIV, supra note 62. at 188-89.
356 See Assisted 1-luman Reproduction Act §§ 3, 5; REPRODEIGTION AND RESPONSIBILEIN,
supra note 62, at 222-24.
367 Greely, supra note 2, at 19.
368 See Johnston & Eliot, supra note 29, at 6-7; supra notes 275-296.
369 See Greely, supra note 2, at 19. The ethical concerns are more prominent if the hu-
man stem cells are inserted into the brains or reproductive organs of animals. See id.
376 Sce id.; Krieger, supra note 54.
371 Greely. supra note 2, at 19; see also Glenn, supra note 274, at 39 (presenting a hypo-
thetical in which human vocal chords are transplanted into a chimpanzee).
372 See Greely, supra note 2, at 19.
373 See REPRODUCTION AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 62, at 188-89.
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2. Addressing Criticism of the AHR Act
The United States should adopt Canada's approach to regulating
chimera technology, particularly because the strong consideration of
individual rights in the United States would mitigate any rigidity in
the Canadian collectivist view.374 Any legislative attempt to regulate
chimera technology, however, must articulate recognition of the op-
posing views on this issue. 375 In Canada, the government's insufficient
justification for the AHR Act disappointed even its supporters. 376
Therefore, the United States should acknowledge the mechanical dif-
ferences between various chimeras and the unique ethical issues they
pose in framing legislation . 377
In adopting legislation similar to the AHR Act, policymakers must
decide whether to create an administrative body for oversight of chi-
mera technology and whether to utilize criminal law to limit potentially
harmful technoIogy.378 Proposed bills to ban human cloning have in-
cluded criminal sanctions; therefore, the criminalization of scientific
activity is not without precedent. 379 The inadequacy of the patchwork
regulations under the Consolidated Framework strongly suggests the
need for a single overseeing body to address novel biotechnology. 38°
Ultimately, the success of legislation to regulate chimera technology will
depend on effective enforcement through criminal sanctions, a regula-
tory agency, or both 381
3. Chimera Regulation Would Not Violate the U.S. Constitution
The regulation of the creation of human-nonhuman embryonic
chimeras would not violate the First Amendment, because biotech-
374 See Young, supra note 213, at 85.
375 See Caulfield. supra note 14, at 3.
376 See id. at 3-4.
377
 See id.
378 See Campbell, supra note 209, at 29 (arguing that a regulatory body would suggest
that questionable activities are acceptable and would lack democratic responsiveness and
accountability, whereas criminal regulation would be the most effective way to deal with
harmful biotechnology). But see Timothy Caulfield, Bill C-13 The Assisted Human Reproduc-
tion Act: Examining the Arguments Against a Regulatory Approach. 11 HEALTH L. REv. 20,20-23
(2002).
379 See Jo 11 NSON, sopro note 280, at 16-17.
991! See supra notes 142-148 and accompanying text.
949 See generally REPRODUCTION AND REsPoNstlitirrY, supra note 62, at 188-89 (discuss-
ing the potential to create a new regulatory agency to oversee biotechnology in the United
States, but noting the complexity of establishing such an agency); Angela Campbell, A
Place for Criminal Law in the Regulation of Reproductive Technologies, 10 HEALTH L.J. 77,95-100
(2002) (justifying criminal law as a useful regulatory tool for Canadian biotechnology).
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nology regulation does not hamper freedom of speech or religion, as
there is no fundamental right to scientific inquiry. 382 Accordingly,
general viewpoint-neutral regulation of expression in biotechnology is
permissible under rational basis review. 383
To the extent chimera creation is expressive conduct and regula-
tion is not viewpoint neutral, regulation must satisfy strict scrutiny if it
is not narrowly tailored. 384 In this regard, a law prohibiting the crea-
tion of chimeras would have to serve a compelling state interest and
must not suppress free expression; 385 however, to the extent that chi-
mera research is expressive, it may be commercial speech, subject to
intermediate scrutiny. 386 Although the U.S. Supreme Court has held
that scientific investigations are not generally commercial, recent ef-
forts to showcase transgenic art suggest commercial, non-scientific
reasons to create chimeras. 387
CONCLUSION
With rapid developments in biotechnology blurring the lines be-
tween species and calling into question what it means to be a human
person, human-nonhuman chimeras are no longer products of sci-
ence fiction. Congress has been unable to reach a consensus on the
regulation of biotechnology involving completely human subjects,
such as human cloning and embryo research. As a result, scientists
continue to create chimeras with increasing quantities of human tis-
sues and genetic materials without limitation. The debate has found
an audience in the patent system, but resolution of complex moral
and scientific issues is better left to a public forum. Furthermore,
chimera regulation cannot be accomplished effectively through exist-
ing legislation or regulatory agencies such as the FDA.
Consequently, the United States should consider legislation to
regulate the production of certain types of chimeras, particularly Im-
man-nonlitunan embryonic chimeras. Legislation would not raise any
368 U.S. ConsT. amend. see Adams, supra note 117, at 108.
383
 See id.
381 Sec id. at 110.
385
 Sec irl.
386 Sce id. at 111-12.
387 See Va. State P.d. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748. 762
(1976) (finding some commercial speech to be within First Amendment protection); see
also Oct. 2003 Reconunendations. supra note 195 (Dr. William Hurlbut suggesting that
individuals might have commercial motivations to create genetic anomalies); Adams. supra
note 117, at 110.
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insurmountable constitutional issues with regard to scientific expres-
sion and would avoid the constitutional issues that will arise if scien-
tists develop new species of humanlike chimeras. The United States
should follow Canada's approach in preparing legislation to regulate
chimera production. In adopting legislation modeled after Canada's
AHR Act, the United States should reexamine its individualist ap-
proach to biotechnology and consider the critical definitional and
ethical issues in regulating chimeras. Unregulated biotechnology, like
the Chimera of Lycia, threatens to disrupt legal and social institu-
tions; therefore, the United States must make a balanced effort now
to protect the public interest.
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